East Tennessee State University

Digital Commons @ East
Tennessee State University
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Student Works

8-2018

Warning Confidence and Perceptions of Lava Flow
Hazard Diversion Strategies at Kīlauea and Mauna
Loa volcanoes, Hawai‘i
Ashleigh Reeves
East Tennessee State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd
Part of the Geology Commons, Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, and the Social
Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Reeves, Ashleigh, "Warning Confidence and Perceptions of Lava Flow Hazard Diversion Strategies at Kīlauea and Mauna Loa
volcanoes, Hawai‘i" (2018). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 3454. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/3454

This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State
University. For more information, please contact digilib@etsu.edu.

Warning Confidence and Perceptions of Lava Flow Hazard Diversion Strategies at Kīlauea and
Mauna Loa volcanoes, Hawai‘i
________________________

A thesis
presented to
the faculty of the Department of Geosciences
East Tennessee State University

In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Science in Geosciences
with a concentration in Geospatial Analysis

__________________________

by
Ashleigh K. Reeves
August 2018

___________________________

Dr. Christopher Gregg, Chair
Dr. Michael Lindell
Dr. Andrew Joyner

Keywords: Kīlauea, Mauna Loa, lava flow, diversion, warning confidence, 2014-15 lava crisis

ABSTRACT
Warning Confidence and Perceptions of Lava Flow Hazard Diversion Strategies at Kīlauea and
Mauna Loa volcanos Hawai‘i
by
Ashleigh K. Reeves
The 2014-15 lava flow crisis at Kīlauea volcano, Hawai‘i and post-September 2015 elevated
unrest at adjacent Mauna Loa volcano provided opportunities to assess households’
psychological and behavioral responses to different levels of volcanic activity. We used the
Protective Action Decision Model to examine stakeholder perceptions and confidence in
warnings, in addition to attitudes toward lava flow mitigation strategies, such as diversion by
berms and bombing, and people’s acceptance of additional risk to personal property in exchange
for protecting important elements of their community, such as schools, major roads, electrical
substation, and shopping centers. Respondents’ confidence in events important in decisionmaking during emergencies and evacuations were significantly correlated with their past
experience with lava forecasts. Consistent with previous studies, overall support for the two
different mitigation measures was higher for earthen berms/trenches than it was for
bombing/blasting. Finally, diversion acceptance was strongly correlated with residents’
perceptions of lava flow diversion strategies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Hawai‘i Island is the youngest and largest island in the Hawaiian chain with three active and
subaerially exposed volcanoes— Kīlauea volcano being the youngest and most active, followed
by Mauna Loa and Hualālai. Kīlauea has erupted 34 times since 1952 A.D. and nearly
continuously along its East Rift Zone (ERZ) since 1983 (USGS 1992, Gregg et al. 2008, Poland
et al. 2015). Additionally, a vent opened in 2008 at Kīlauea’s summit crater—Halemaʻumaʻu,
which hosts an active lava pond and a vigorous gas plume, resulting in the occurrence of dual
eruptions from the ERZ and summit since that time. And at the time of preparation of this thesis
in May 2018, dual eruptions are occurring along the lower ERZ and at the summit, with at least
18 fissures opening in the former and explosions at the latter. Mauna Loa, in comparison, has
erupted only two time since 1954 (in 1975 and 1984), although it has erupted 33 times since its
first well-documented historical eruption in 1843. Mauna Loa’s most recent eruption occurred in
1984 (Trusdell 2012). Hualālai is the least active of the three volcanoes and last erupted twice in
ca. 1800-1801 (Kauahikaua and Camara, 2000). The island of Hawai‘i is also the fastest
developing region in the State of Hawai‘i, spurred by having the most affordable land in the
state, much of which is situated in areas of high lava flow hazard on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa.
Such development in areas of high lava flow hazard on Kīlauea’s ERZ and downslope of Mauna
Loa’s Southwest Rift Zone (SWRZ; Trusdell 1995) exacerbate risks from lava flow hazards on
the island.
While experiencing a population increase of twenty-four percent in the last decade, Hawaiʿi
Island now has over 100,000 residents (United States Census Bureau 2010). And although
population growth has occurred over several decades, the location of residential development has
been largely confined to areas in the eastern and southern regions of the island—especially the
10

political districts of Puna, South Kona, and Kaʿū, while commercial development to support the
visitor industry has largely occurred outside these areas on the west-central side of the island in
North Kona district.
Background
Several eruptions of Kīlauea and Mauna Loa over the last ca. 100 years provided island
residents and agencies with abundant and relatively recent lava flow hazard experience. Kīlauea
provides the greatest experience, as several communities (e.g., Pāhoa, Kapoho, Royal Gardens
and Kalapana) were all threatened or destroyed by lava since eruptions began occurring more
frequently beginning in 1955 compared to the previous century. Kīlauea’s eruptions along the
ERZ in 2014-2015 and beginning in May 2018 provide very recent experience, as hundreds to
thousands of people have evacuated and dozens of structures destroyed. In contrast, Mauna Loa
has only erupted three times since 1950 (1950, 1975 and 1984) and this greatly limits the
experience of all stakeholders. This is a concern because of the higher effusion rates and steeper
slopes, which contribute to higher lava flow front velocities and reduced early warning times
compared to Kīlauea. People’s response to eruption and to the threat of eruption has largely
involved evacuation and the bearing of both insured and uninsured losses. However, island
residents and agencies have occasionally used structural diversion strategies to mitigate lava flow
hazards and protect private, commercial and government property. Earthen barriers, bombs, and
water have been the most common mitigation strategies for lava flows. However, decisions to
use such mitigation strategies that interfere in the natural path of the lava flows may be based on
expert scientific opinion, but public opposition has been reported to be sufficient to prevent lava
mitigation (Hawai‘i State Civil Defense 2002). The recent activity at these two volcanoes—
eruption at Kīlauea and unrest at Mauna Loa, raises questions about how residents in risk areas
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have viewed these threats, particularly how they view aspects of warnings, evacuations and lava
diversion strategies .
This thesis consists of two studies, both of which are discussed in further detail in the
subsequent chapters:
Study one. The goal of this study is to examine how differences in the characteristics of
volcanic activity, topography, and histories of two active volcanoes affect five dependent
variables—respondents’ protective actions, hazard information sources, perceptions of lava flow
forecasts, stakeholder perceptions, and confidence in evacuation feasibility. This study also
examines the influence of community bondedness, hazard zones, and demographic
characteristics on the five dependent variables. The rationale for this approach stems from
disaster research literature on protective action decision making, including the Protective Action
Decision Model (PADM—Lindell and Perry 2012; Lindell 2017) and findings from research on
Hawaiian populations (Murton and Shimabukuro 1974; Sorenson and Germehl 1980; Gregg et
al. 2004a; Gregg et al. 2004b; Gregg et al. 2008).
Study two. The goal of this study to understand public opinion about lava mitigation
strategies such as diversion by berms or bombing— including the effectiveness of these
mitigation strategies for lava flows and other hazards; their financial and legal considerations;
and their requirements for specialized knowledge, skills and cooperation. People’s acceptance of
additional risk to personal property in exchange for protecting important elements of their
community such as schools, major roads, electrical substation, and shopping centers was also
considered because of the disparity in how the residents responded to the use of different
mitigation strategies during the 2014-2015 eruption. We evaluate these opinions about mitigation
with crisis experience, hazard zonation, and perceptions of stakeholders.
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CHAPTER 2
ASSESSING WARNING CONFIDENCE AND PERCEPTIONS OF FORECASTING
DURING VOLCANIC CRISIS AND UNREST AT KĪLAEA AND MAUNA LOA
VOLCANOES, HAWAI‘I
Abstract. The 2014-15 lava flow crisis at Kīlauea volcano, Hawai‘i and post-September 2015
elevated unrest at adjacent Mauna Loa volcano provided opportunities to assess households’
psychological and behavioral responses to different levels of volcanic activity and uncertainty in
the regions of variable lava flow hazard. The Kīlauea sample (N= 218) was asked about their
perceptions of lava flow forecasts and response experiences to the United States Geological
Survey’s Volcano Alert Level (VAL) — Warning (i.e., the highest level of alert in the United
States VAL system), and Hawai‘i County Civil Defense Agency evacuation orders during the lava
flow crisis, while the Mauna Loa sample (N= 203) was asked about perceptions of future forecasts
and response to warnings and evacuations during the elevated period of unrest (i.e., increased from
Normal to Advisory— two levels below Warning). We also examined how survey respondents
perceived specific stakeholders— i.e., themselves and their families, their peers, news media,
elected officials, and government agencies, with respect to characteristics of hazard expertise,
trustworthiness, and protection responsibility.
In general, we show that the relationship between respondents’ confidence in factors important
in decision-making during emergencies and evacuations, such as receiving accurate lava flow
forecasts and having time to prepare to evacuate, were most significantly correlated with the
respondents’ past experience with lava forecasts. For example, the study found that residence in
areas of high lava flow hazard correlated with increased perceptions of accurate lava flow
forecasts— that is, those in high hazard zones closest to the source of eruptions were more likely
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than their counterparts in areas of lower lava flow hazards to believe the United States Geological
Survey would issue accurate lava forecasts.
1. Introduction
Development of land in areas of high lava flow hazards on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes,
Hawai‘i (Fig. 2.1) has increased significantly over the last few decades (Trusdell, 1995; Poland et
al, 2015). The United States Geological Survey (USGS), Hawaiian Volcano Observatory (HVO)
monitors volcano and seismic hazards on the island and issues warning-related messages
(Sorensen and Gersmehl, 1980) through the Volcano Alert Level System (VAL/VALS; Ewert,
Guffanti and Murray, 2005). County, State and Federal offices use VALs— Normal, Advisory,
Watch and Warning, established by HVO to make decisions concerning evacuation and other
emergency responses. Similarly, other stakeholders use the VALs and eruption and lava flow
forecasts to prioritize risk reduction activities. Here, we describe the results of sample survey
research of residents’ perceptions of specific stakeholders and beliefs about lava forecasts and
warnings and evacuations. The study is framed around resident experiences on Kīlauea and Mauna
Loa.
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Figure 2.1: Location of volcanoes in study area (Kīlauea, Mauna Loa, Hualālai) and rift zones
(Kīlauea’s East Rift Zone (ERZ) and Mauna Loa’s Southwest Rift Zone (SWRZ)) on the island of
Hawai‘i, major roads, and USGS designated lava flow hazard zones. Inset map shows elevation
and the location of volcanoes in the study area again for reference.

Kīlauea has been in a near continuous state of eruption since 1983 (Poland et al., 2015; Heliker
et al., 2003), but on June 27, 2014 a new vent opened and allowed lava to slowly flow toward
developed areas in the district of Puna on the eastern end of the island. The event evolved into an
emergency on August 22, 2014 when the USGS HVO issued a press release stating, "Kīlauea lava
flow northeast of Pu‘u ‘Ō‘ō a potential concern" (USGS, 2014). This coincided with recovery
efforts related to a major hurricane that struck the southern half of the island as Tropical Storm
Iselle (Kimberlain et al., 2014) just two weeks earlier. With residents still recovering from the
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impacts of Iselle, schools and businesses closed, residents evacuated, and alternate roads were
graded at great expense in preparation for the arrival of lava (see Poland et al, 2016).
The 2014-15 lava flow crisis ended with minimal direct damage caused by actual lava
encroachment and inundation on structures, but considerable economic impacts were borne out by
responses to the threat of inundation and isolation by lava. The threat of isolation and inundation
meant residents’ needed to take action to evacuate or relocate belongings. By late March 2015,
breakouts upslope diverted lava away from the flow front, so HVO downgraded the VAL from
Warning to Watch, signifying the immediate threat was over, although a moratorium put into place
on property insurance would not be lifted for several months. The moratorium meant residents’
were unable to purchase or increase property insurance. Three months after the moratorium was
lifted in June, HVO issued a press release in September 2015 (USGS, 2015) indicating they were
raising the VAL from Normal to Advisory at nearby Mauna Loa due to increases in unrest
indicators above known background levels. While there was no imminent threat of an eruption,
HVO interpreted the unrest to indicate an increasing likelihood of an eruption on the volcano’s
southwest rift zone (SWRZ), which, along with Kīlauea’s East Rift Zone (ERZ), comprise areas
of high lava flow hazard and increasing residential and commercial development.
While Kīlauea lava flows provided recent experience with responding to lava flow forecasts
and evacuations, Mauna Loa had not erupted since 1984, and not along the SWRZ since 1950, so
there is limited social and agency experience with Mauna Loa eruptions. Lava flows from both
volcanoes have both advanced at variable rates, but in general, the lower effusion rates and slopes
on Kīlauea contribute to slower advance rates that at Mauna Loa, while higher effusion rates and
steep slopes on Mauna Loa contribute to faster flows. In both places, residential subdivisions are
located on and down slope of the rift zones, exacerbating volcanic risk. The threat of fast lava
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flows on Mauna Loa’s SWRZ and eruption sources near developed areas could affect nearby
populations in short time periods. One additional concern for residents residing near Mauna Loa’s
SWRZ is that indirect experience with Kīlauea’s slower moving lava flows, and lack of any
experience in Ka‘ū and South Kona since 1950, could prompt residents to develop similar
expectations for lava flow forecasts, warnings, and evacuations.
Residential development has been largely confined to the Puna District on the eastern flank of
Kīlauea and to the districts of Ka‘ū and S Kona on the south flank of Mauna Loa (Fig. 2.2 & Fig.
2.3). Increasing population and development in these areas is spurred by the presence of the most
affordable land in the state in areas situated in high lava flow hazard zones. Murton and
Shimabukaro (1974) reported that while some household and business hazard adjustments
included evacuation of personal and private property from eruptions of Kīlauea, the bearing of
losses was the most common adjustment, meaning that evacuation and acceptance of losses due to
lava flows were the most common response.
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Figure 2.2: Map showing the Puna district (outlined in white) as well as nearby towns and residential
subdivisions. This map highlights 20th and 21st century lava flows for Kīlauea in gray and the
recent 2014 lava flow in red.
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Figure 2.3: Map showing the Kaʿū, South Kona, and North Kona districts (outlined in white) as well as
nearby towns and residential subdivisions. This map highlights 20th century lava flows for Mauna
Loa in gray.

The on-going unrest at Mauna Loa and the recent crisis at Kīlauea raises questions about how
residents in these risk areas view these events. The goal of this study is therefore to examine how
differences in the characteristics of volcanic activity, topography, and histories of these two
volcanoes affect five dependent variables—respondents’ protective actions, hazard information
sources, perceptions of lava flow forecasts, stakeholder perceptions, and confidence in evacuation
feasibility. We also examine the influence of community bondedness (i.e., sense of community),
hazard zone, and demographic characteristics on the five dependent variables. The rationale for
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this approach stems from disaster research literature on protective action decision making,
including the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM—Lindell, 2017; Lindell and Perry, 2012)
and findings from research on Hawaiian populations (Gregg et al., 2008; Gregg et al., 2004a;
Gregg et al., 2004b; Sorenson and Gersmehl, 1980; Murton and Shimabukuro, 1974).

2. Theoretical Background
The communication of information about complex processes such as volcanic activity (e.g.,
timing, direction, intensity, duration, etc.) is characterized by considerable uncertainty over time.
Focusing on how people consider and interpret uncertainty is useful because it represents a
common factor in how people experience the hazardous environments in which they are being
asked to make mitigation and preparedness decisions (Paton, 2013). Uncertainty is evident, for
example, in predicting when a hazardous event will occur, where it will occur, what the magnitude
and intensity of the event will be, and its impacts, and how long those impacts will last (Paton and
McClure, 2013). People can sometimes find it difficult to readily clarify the uncertainties
associated with hazards and what the most effective measures are that they can implement to
protect themselves from hazard-related consequences (Paton and McClure, 2013).
Much is known about human response to warnings at the individual and family level and at the
emergency warning organizational level (Drabek, 1986). Warning response involves a sequence
of cognitive and behavioral steps, which Mileti and Sorensen (1990) characterized as the sequence
of hearing the warning, understanding the contents of the warning message, believing the warning
is credible and accurate, personalizing the warning to oneself, confirming that the warning is true
and that others are taking notice, and responding by adopting protective action recommendations.
Weinstein (1989) concluded that perceived personal risk is related to the recency, frequency, and
intensity of people’s personal experience with hazard events—a finding supported more recently
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by Lindell and Prater (2000). Direct hazard experience can increase people’s preparedness, but
people can normalize their experiences with relatively minor events and equate those experiences
to future events of greater magnitude or intensity (Johnston et al., 1999). Such “false experience”
(Baker, 1991) leads people to believe that the worst they have experienced is the worst they can
experience. Paton et al. (2008) found that this “normalization bias” can result in people’s
overestimation of their perceived preparedness and perceived need to prepare. Moreover, people
who are farther from hazard sources are less likely to have direct experience with hazard impacts
and, for that reason, tend to have lower levels of perceived personal risk (Lindell and Hwang,
2008).
2.1 Information Sources. Lindell and Perry (2012) state that information-seeking occurs when
there is some degree of uncertainty at a given stage in the PADM. When people lack answers to
questions about a hazardous event or protective actions and they think that there is time available
to find answers to those questions before protective actions have to be taken, they cope with the
uncertainty by searching for additional information (Perry et al., 1981; Perry and Greene, 1983;
Hanson et al., 1979). Among other factors, the perceived credibility of the warning source can
influence the time the person spends seeking and processing information rather than taking
protective action (Perry et al., 1981; Perry and Greene, 1983). It is important to note that during
the 2014-15 lava crisis multiple islands and newspapers ran stories concerning the crisis and the
Hawai‘i Civil Defense made routine daily updates. There were also a variety of Facebook and
other social media sites that many residents’ used as a source for information.
2.2 Stakeholder Perceptions. People confronted with complex issues that they poorly
understand, such as volcanic hazards, generally rely on experts for hazard information and hold
them responsible for protection from the hazard (Gregg et al., 2003). Arlikatti et al. (2007) and
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Birkmann et al. (2008) defined the term stakeholder to include individuals and organizations that
people perceive to have a role in coping with a threat. For this study, the term stakeholder consists
of people ranging from the general population to elected and appointed officials in federal to local
government.
Hazard agencies, such as the HVO, generate information about volcano and seismic hazards
on the island of Hawai‘i (e.g., see USGS, 1992) and disseminate it directly to people residing in
risk areas or make it available through multiple channels. They do this by posting information on
their website and through other forms of communication with state and local agencies, the news
media, and the general public. They also routinely present information orally and in the printed
press. In 2014, they played a key role in Civil Defense’s community meetings during the 20142015 Kīlauea lava flow crisis.
Arlikatti et al. (2007) concluded that peers, officials, and media are typically evaluated on three
characteristics: expertise (technical knowledge of the hazard), trustworthiness (accuracy and
completeness of information communicated about the situation), and protection responsibility.
Stakeholders have the potential to make contributions to the interpretative processes people use to
make sense of uncertain hazardous circumstances. Trust binds stakeholders and community
members in ways that facilitates actions under conditions of uncertainty (Paton, 2013).
As hazard uncertainty increases, many people increase their reliance on official sources of
information to cope because their past experiences have led them to trust and believe in those
sources to provide information (Lindell and Perry, 1992; Paton, 2008; Siegrist and Cvetkovich,
2000). Perceived trustworthiness is an important predictor of protective action decision making;
for instance, lava flows are often hidden from view so people had to trust USGS and Civil Defense
about a hazard that they could not clearly see for themselves. Previous studies have shown that
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stakeholders differ significantly in perceived expertise, trustworthiness, and protection
responsibility, and that these characteristics have significant positive correlations with hazard
adjustment intentions and actual adjustment adoption (Arlikatti et al., 2007; Lindell and Whitney,
2000). People’s willingness to use information to guide their actions under conditions of
uncertainty can be influenced by the degree to which they trust the source of information (Paton,
2013). Other studies suggested that communicating uncertainty can decrease people’s trust in and
credibility of the source, and that can allow people to justify inaction or to perceive risk as being
higher or lower than it is, to be consistent with their pre-existing beliefs (Johnson and Slovic, 1985,
1998; Miles and Frewer, 2003; Smithson, 1999; Wiedemann, 2008).
2.3 Warning Confidence. Extensive research has revealed much about how people react and
respond to hazard warnings (Cutter and Barnes, 1982; Drabek, 1969; Paton et al., 2006; Sorensen,
2000; Sorensen and Mileti, 1988; Sorensen and Vogt-Sorenson, 2007). The decision to either “wait
and see” or act as if there is “no time to lose” is not just dependent on the scenario; forecast content
and format, and people’s decision-making concerns. It is also dependent on their prior perceptions
of the potential outcomes of a period of volcanic unrest and their perceptions of the likelihood of
an event throughout the time during which an eruption or inundation is expected or forecasted
(Doyle et al., 2014).
The immediacy of a threat is important because warning recipients must understand that the
message describes an event whose consequences are likely to occur in the very near future. People
tend to initiate activities such as information seeking and expedient property protection when they
believe there is more time available before impact than the minimum necessary to implement
protective action (Lindell et al., 2015; Perry and Greene, 1983; Perry et al., 1981; Sorensen, 1991).
The actual implementation of protective action depends not only on a person’s intentions to take
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those actions but also on those conditions in their physical and social environment that can impede
actions that they would have otherwise taken (Triandis, 1980). Perry et al. (1981) found that in
most cases the gap between evacuation intentions and behavior at Mount St. Helens seemed to be
caused by impediments rather than unexpected facilitators; there are many instances in which
people have wanted to evacuate but lacked a safe place to go, a safe route to travel, or a personal
vehicle and limited mobility due to physical disabilities (Heath et al., 2001; Van Willigen et al.,
2002).
2.4 Forecast Accuracy. The communication of advice about complex processes whose activity
(i.e., arrival timing, direction, intensity, duration, etc.) is characterized by considerable uncertainty
over time is a global issue. And despite the study of volcanic precursors and eruptions over the
past century, it is still not possible to predict the precise time, place, or magnitude of volcanic
events, and this uncertainty increases significantly with increasing time before the onset of
eruption. During the June 2014-15 lava crisis, HVO made lava flow forecasts to estimate the arrival
time of lava in specific areas downslope of the flow front, but forecasting became rather difficult
with the lava flow front advancing, stalling and widening, and then becoming inactive due to the
fluctuating supply of lava from the source vent and breakdowns in the lava tube (Poland et al.,
2015). Measured advance rates of the lava flow front were used to provide a range of potential
arrival times at important areas downslope of the flow front. Such information was subsequently
used by authorities and residents downslope to prioritize responses. Residents’ and agencies
needed to know lava arrival time in order to set their priorities. There was certainly time available
at Kīlauea to evacuate but some communities on the ERZ were at greater risk because the area
could potentially be the source of a future eruption. Also it is important to note, Mauna Loa
eruptions happen quickly so it would make sense for people to differ in this regard based on the
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whether they live near Mauna Loa or Kīlauea volcano. This survey aims to answer a very important
question regarding forecasting accuracy and that is— how accurate do residents believe lava
forecasts were at Kīlauea during the 2014-15 lava crisis and also how do they perceive future
forecasts at Mauna Loa?
2.5 Community Bondedness. Paton et al. (2001) found a significant correlation between
people’s sense of community and the level of support for hazard management strategies. Barberi
et al. (2008) also reported a relatively high mean level near Vesuvius was positively correlated
with important risk factors (e.g., household and government preparedness, confidence in the
evacuation plan, and receipt of information about volcanic hazards). Similar results were found
for residents near Campi Flegrei (Ricci et al., 2013; Davis et al., 2006). Wei and Lindell (2017)
reported that community bondedness significantly predicted household emergency and evacuation
preparedness at Mt. Rainier.
2.6 Hazard Proximity. Proximity to hazard sources affects respondents’ risk perceptions via
their personal experience with hazardous events and higher levels of information dissemination to
those in areas of highest risk (Lindell and Hwang, 2008).
2.7 Research Objective. This study examined the relationship between respondents’
confidence in events important in decision-making during an imminent lava threat including: a)
confidence in the accuracy of lava arrival forecasts, b) that an official warning would be received
before a hazard arrives at their location, c) that they would have time to prepare to evacuate, and
d) that they would have the ability to evacuate to a safe location once a lava flow begins but before
their home is threatened. We also assessed their past hazard experience and used a Geographical
Information System to evaluate the spatial distribution of households across the island’s lava flow
hazard zones (USGS 1992). Because the June 27 lava flow advanced at a fairly slow rate (from 0
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to 500 m day-1), residents in the highest hazard zones may overestimate the amount of time
available to prepare in future lava flow scenarios, which could have much higher flow rates during
other eruptions of both Kīlauea and Mauna Loa.
This study also investigated the correlation between stakeholder perceptions and respondents’
confidence in warnings, as Lindell and Perry (2012) suggested that respondents’ who viewed other
stakeholders as more knowledgeable and trustworthy, and as having more personal responsibility
to protect themselves from environmental hazards, are more likely to take protective action than
those without these views. Whether protective actions are taken can sometimes be facilitated or
impeded by a person’s access to resources; therefore this study examined the influence of the
respondents’ sense of belonging to the community and demographic characteristics on their
perceptions of stakeholders and confidence in warnings.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1 Survey Procedure. Data were collected from adult residents (18 years and older) in areas
on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa using two nearly identical household survey questionnaires distributed
equally to 800 people on each volcano between April and July 2017. The questionnaires were
modelled after those used by Greene et al. (1981), Perry and Greene (1983), Lindell and Whitney
(2000), Davis et al. (2006), Perry and Lindell (2008), Apatu et al. (2015), and Wei and Lindell
(2017). The 1600 households were randomly selected and spatially distributed across three lava
flow hazard zones (USGS 1992) on the east side of Kīlauea and four zones on the southern side of
Mauna Loa. Following Dillman’s (2000) Tailored Design Method, each household was sent an
initial questionnaire, cover letter and self-addressed, postage paid return envelope beginning on
March 15. Non-respondents were subsequently sent a reminder postcard and as many as two
replacement questionnaire packages. Recruitment was terminated on July 4. Some 138 (8.6%)
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packets were undeliverable and only one packet was refused. A total of 421 households returned
usable questionnaires for a response rate of deliverable packets 29% (15% from Kīlauea and 14%
from Mauna Loa; see Table 2.1). The study was approved by ETSU’s Institutional Review Board
(c0117.9sd).
Table 2.1: Total response rate for each hazard zone for Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes
Site; Hazard Zone

Percent

Count (N)

1. Kīlauea; Highest

2.2

8

2. Kīlauea; Moderate

14.2

53

3. Kīlauea; Lowest

39.8

148

4. Mauna Loa; Highest

14.0

52

5. Mauna Loa; Moderate

19.4

72

6. Mauna Loa; Lowest

10.5

39

3.2 Measures.
3.2.1 Dependent variables. The five dependent variables assessed in this study included—
protective actions taken; information sources sought; information sources through which
information was received; perceptions of stakeholders as trustworthy, knowledgeable (i.e.,
experts) and responsible for protecting the population; confidence in warnings and response; and
perceptions of the accuracy of lava flow forecasts. Many people in lower Puna needed to take
action to evacuate or relocate belongings, house contents, valuables, etc. due to the potential threat
of isolation during the 2014-15 lava flow crisis.
Regarding protective actions taken in response to the crisis, Kīlauea respondents were asked
“Did the June 2014-2015 lava flow crisis in Puna cause you to do any of the following due to
concerns about the safety of yourself, your family, or your property?” Similarly, Mauna Loa
respondents were asked “Has the increased volcano unrest at Mauna Loa since September 2015
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caused you to do any of the following due to concerns about the safety of yourself, your family or
your property.” Specific protective actions were: a) prepare to evacuate your home; b) actually
evacuate your home; c) prepare to put your home up for sale; d) actually put your home up for
sale; e) review homeowner or renter insurance with respect to lava or fire; and f) try to either
purchase or increase your property insurance. All six items were rated No (=1) or Yes (=2).
Questions about information sources addressed the 2014-15 lava crisis. We asked Kīlauea
respondents: “How many community-wide meetings about lava flow hazard did you attend during
the June 2014-2015 lava flow crisis in Puna?” The response options available were: None, 1-2, 34, 5-6, 7-8, and 9 or more. The responses were highly skewed so they were coded into “Attended
meetings” (= 1) and “Did not attend meetings” (= 0). There was no similar question asked of
Mauna Loa respondents because they would not have reasonably attended the community
meetings for the Kīlauea crisis and there were no equivalent meetings for them during the unrest.
We asked all respondents about the extent to which they received information through specific
channels from other stakeholders. For the Kīlauea respondents, we asked: “To what extent did you
receive information about the June 2014-2015 lava flow crisis in Puna from the following?” For
the Mauna Loa sample, the question was as follows: “In September 2015, the USGS Hawaiian
Volcano Observatory raised the Volcano Alert Level at Mauna Loa from Normal to Advisory
because of signs of unrest above background levels. To what extent have you received information
about this volcano unrest from...” The response options (i.e., channels through which information
was received) were: a) radio on-air broadcasts; b) television on-air broadcasts; c) newspaper print
editions; d) websites of radio stations, TV stations, or newspapers; e) the US Geological Survey
Hawai’i Volcano Observatory website; f) the Hawai‘i Civil Defense website; and g) social media.
The items were all rated on a five-point Likert scale from “Not at all” (= 1) to “Very great extent”
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(=5). Based on a factor analysis of the responses, the items were used to form two scales—
“traditional media” (calculated using the mean scores of radio on-air broadcasts, television on-air
broadcasts, newspaper print editions, and websites of radio or TV stations, or newspapers; α = .81)
and “new media” (calculated using the mean scores of the USGS HVO website, Hawai‘i Civil
Defense website, and social media; α = .80).
Lastly, we asked respondents to rate other stakeholder groups with respect to three
characteristics—their hazard knowledge (i.e., expertise), their trustworthiness and their
responsibility for protecting the population. The stakeholder groups were—federal, state, and local
agencies; media; state and local officials; peers; and their immediate family. Respondents from
Kīlauea were asked to rate the stakeholders in the context of Kīlauea, while respondents on Mauna
Loa were asked to rate stakeholders with respect to Mauna Loa. The characteristics were, more
specifically: 1) hazard expertise: “To what extent do you think the following individuals or
organizations are knowledgeable about Kīlauea [cf. Mauna Loa] lava flows?”; 2) trustworthiness:
“To what extent do you think each of the following is willing to provide you with accurate
information about Kīlauea [cf. Mauna Loa] lava flows?”; and 3) protection responsibility: “To
what extent do you think each of following is responsible for protecting you from Kīlauea [cf.
Mauna Loa] lava flows?” These items were all anchored by a five-point Likert scale from “Not at
all” (=1) to “Very great extent” (=5). Based on the results of a factor analysis that identified five
factors, three scales were created using the mean scores of: a) stakeholders (federal, state, and local
agencies, state and local elected officials) based on their perceived trustworthiness (Cronbach’s α
= .91); b) based on their perceived expertise (α = .92); and c) based on their perceived protection
responsibility (α = .95). In addition, two scales were created using the mean scores of: d)
government agencies (federal, state, and local agencies) based on their perceived trustworthiness
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and expertise (α = .92); and e) the respondents themselves, their immediate family, and their peers
based on their perceived trustworthiness, expertise, and protection responsibility (α = .82).
Respondents were also asked to indicate their confidence in four aspects of warnings and
response to future volcanic activity: “How likely do you think it is that each of the following will
happen after a lava flow begins but before your home is threatened: a) you will receive an accurate
forecast of lava arrival time, b) you will receive an official evacuation warning, c) you can prepare
to evacuate, and d) you can prepare to evacuate to a safe location?” These items were all anchored
by a five-point Likert scale from “Extremely unlikely” (=1) to “Extremely likely” (=5) and
averaged to create a scale with α = .87.
Additionally, people’s perceptions of the accuracy of previous lava flow forecasts at Kīlauea
and future forecasts at Mauna Loa were evaluated by asking the Kīlauea sample: “How accurate
do you think the lava flow forecasts during the June 2014-2015 lava flow crisis in Puna were with
respect to...” For the Mauna Loa sample, we asked: “How accurate do you think lava flow forecasts
will be during any future eruption of Mauna Loa with respect to…” Response options were: a)
locations to be affected, b) amount of lava expected at those locations, and c) time at which lava
would arrive at those locations. Scale scores were created from the mean of the three items (within
a respondent) being computed and then analyzed over respondents.
3.2.2 Independent variables. Respondents were asked to rate their sense of community, which
has also been described as community bondedness (Turner et al., 1986; Wei and Lindell, 2017).
Specifically, respondents were asked, “To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the
following statements: (a) I feel like I belong in this community, (b) I believe my neighbors would
help me in an emergency, (c) Even if I had the opportunity I would not move out of this community,
(d) I feel loyal to the people in my community, (e) I often have friends over at my house to see me,
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(f) I plan to remain a resident of this community for a number of years. The items were all rated
on a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly disagree” (= 1) to “Strongly agree” (= 5). These items
were averaged to create a scale with α = .83.
Our study areas comprised households in USGS lava flow hazard Zones 1-4 and 6, although
the few respondents (N = 41) in Zone 4 are actually located just off the flank of Mauna Loa and
on the southwest flank of Hūalalai (Fig. 2.1). The inclusion of these households was an artifact of
sampling from PO Box zip codes. Zone 4 is restricted to Hūalalai where eruptions are less frequent
than at Mauna Loa and Kīlauea. Zone 1 only includes the summits and two rift zones of Kīlauea
and Mauna Loa where vents have been repeatedly active in historical times. Zone 2 includes land
adjacent to and immediately downslope from Zone 1. Zone 3 is less hazardous than Zone 2 because
of greater distance from recently active vents or because topography reduces the hazard, or both.
High topography reduces two other zones—Zone 5 on Kīlauea and Zone 6 on Mauna Loa. There
was no need to recode respondents living in Kīlauea lava flow Zones 1, 2, and 3, but we recoded
the Mauna Loa Zones 1 and 2 as 1, Zone 3 as 2, and Zones 4 and 6 as 3. Recoding provided three
levels of lava flow hazard for each sample.
To assess respondents’ demographic characteristics, we asked their marital status: married,
single, divorced, or widowed (coded as “married” = 1 and “not married” = 0). Respondents were
also asked, “How many people in your household are: Less than 18 years, 18-65 years, over 65
years” (added to compute the total number of people in the household). Respondents were asked
to describe their yearly household income before taxes: less than $25,000 (= 1), $25,001-$50,000
(= 2), $50,001-$75,000 (= 3), $75,001-$100,000 (= 4), or over $100,000 (= 5), and their highest
level of education attained: elementary school (grades 1-6 = 1), Junior High or Middle School
(grades 7-8 = 2), High School (grades 9-12 = 3), College Degree (2 or 4 year degree = 4), or
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Graduate Degree (= 5). We also asked their ethnicity: Caucasian, Native American, African
American, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, Mixed, and Other (coded as “white” = 1 and “nonwhite” = 0).
3.3 Statistical Analysis. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to assess the differences
among the respondents residing in the three lava flow hazard zones on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa
volcanoes with respect to their perceptions of stakeholders, warning confidence, past hazard
experience, community bondedness, and demographic characteristics (i.e., sex, age, income,
education, ethnicity, marital status, and household size). Pearson correlations were used to assess
the degree of association among the independent and dependent variables. The experiment-wise
error rate was controlled by setting a conservative significance level of p ≤ .01. All analyses were
conducted in SPSS Version 23 and ArcGIS 10.4.
4. Results
4.1 Differences by Volcano and Hazard Zone. The results for Kīlauea respondents’ attendance
at community meetings during the 2014-15 lava flow crisis by hazard zone are presented in Table
2.2, which shows that there were significant differences among hazard zones (𝜒𝜒32 = 15.6, p < .001).
Specifically, respondents in the lowest hazard zone (i.e., zone 3 on Kīlauea, which has a lower

hazard rating than zone 2) had a significantly lower percentage of attendance than those in the
moderate hazard zone (total responses from the highest hazard zone were too low to draw
meaningful conclusions).
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Table 2.2: Community meeting attendance during the June 2014-15 lava crisis at Kīlauea
volcano.
Assigned
Hazard Zone
High

USGS Lava Flow
Hazard Zone
1

Did not attend
meetings
4 (50%)

Attended meetings
4 (50%)

Moderate

2

21 (41.2%)

30 (58.8%)

Low

3

96 (65.3%)

51 (34.7%)

There were no statistically significant differences between Kīlauea and Mauna Loa on the
respondents’ demographic characteristics or on the proportions of respondents who prepared for
evacuation (0.25 vs. 0.16) or implemented evacuation (0.02 vs. 0.05), prepared to sell their homes
(0.04 vs. 0.04), actually put them up for sale (0.01 vs. 0.02), reviewed insurance (0.37 vs. 0.15),
or purchased or increased insurance coverage (0.03 vs. 0.02) as indicated by Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Mean ratings for response actions.
Variables
1. Prepared for evacuation
2. Implemented evacuation
3. Prepared to sell their home
4. Actually put their home up for sale
5. Reviewed insurance
6. Tried to purchase or increase insurance
coverage

Kīlauea
1.25
1.02
1.04
1.01
1.37

Mauna Loa
1.16
1.05
1.04
1.02
1.15

1.03

1.02

Table 2.4 shows that all stakeholders received mean ratings above the rating scale midpoint (3
on a scale of 1-5) except peers on protection responsibility (M = 2.90). With respect to expertise,
there is a clear hierarchy from federal agencies to peers and state elected officials. Respondents
rated themselves and their families as being as knowledgeable as the news media (t402 = -1.88, ns)
but less knowledgeable than government agencies (t404 = 3.75, p < .01). Roughly the same rank
order is found with respect to ratings of trustworthiness, except that peers are considered to be
more trustworthy than local elected officials (t402 = 8.23, p < .01). All government agencies are
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considered to be equally trustworthy and both types of elected officials are considered to be equally
trustworthy. Respondents rated their families as being as trustworthy as the news media (t404 =
0.53, ns) but less trustworthy than government agencies (t403 = 5.87, p < .01). Finally, there is a
similar rank order for protection responsibility, with all government agencies considered to be
equally responsible and the news media and both types of elected officials considered to be equally
responsible. Respondents rated themselves and their families as having significantly higher
protection responsibility than other stakeholders (t403 = 9.35, p < .01).
Table 2.4: Ratings of stakeholders on expertise, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility
(Mean and standard error of mean).
Stakeholder
FedAgen
StatAgen
LocAgen
NewsMedia
StateElecOff
LocElecOff
Peers
Self/family2

Expertise
4.40 ± .05
4.16 ± .05
4.06 ± .05
3.52 ± .06
3.15 ± .06
3.40 ± .06
3.13 ± .06
3.64 ± .06

Trustworthiness
4.35 ± .05a
4.30 ± .05a
4.18 ± .05
3.90 ± .06
3.42 ± .06b
3.56 ± .06b
3.71 ± .06
3.88 ± .06

Protection Responsibility
3.72 ± .07a
3.81 ± .07a
3.76 ± .07a
3.07 ± .08b
3.12 ± .08b
3.19 ± .08b
2.90 ± .07
4.04 ± .07

Note: Adjacent stakeholders have statistically significant differences unless designated by a common superscript.
*Family but not self was rated for trustworthiness.

4.2 Correlation Analysis. Results from the correlation analysis are presented in Table 2.5. The
correlation analysis yielded an average r = 0.01 of the demographic characteristics with the
remaining variables. Among the 108 correlations of the eight demographic variables with 18 other
variables, only five were statistically significant (p < .01). This 5% statistical significance rate is
only slightly larger than the 1% that would be expected by chance, but there was a somewhat
consistent pattern in that three of the significant correlations were of ethnicity with government
protection responsibility, self/peer expertise/trustworthiness, and reliance on traditional media (r
= 0.14, 0.13, and 0.19, respectively).
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In contrast to demographics, community bondedness had significant correlations with
perceptions of government expertise, government trustworthiness (r = 0.27 and 0.19, respectively),
self/peers expertise/trustworthiness (r = 0.24), and warning confidence (r = 0.19). Volcano site
(Mauna Loa = 1) had a marginal correlation with self/peers expertise and trustworthiness (r = 0.15), but not any of the other stakeholder characteristics. Volcano site also had significant
correlations with government trustworthiness (r = 0.19), expertise/trust in news media (r = 0.24),
and confidence in warnings (r = 0.19). Neither community bondedness nor volcano site had any
significant correlations with response actions (average r = -0.01). Hazard zone had significant
correlations with both information sources, traditional media and new media (r = -0.22 and -0.25,
respectively).

Hazard

zone

also

had

significant

correlations

with

self/peers,

expertise/trustworthiness (r = -0.15), and forecasting accuracy (r = -0.14).
Perceptions of government expertise and government trustworthiness were highly correlated
with each other (r = 0.71) and both were moderately correlated with perceptions of protection
responsibility (r = 0.41 and 0.39, respectively). Moreover, government ratings on all three
characteristics were strongly correlated with ratings of self/peers expertise/trustworthiness (r =
0.50, 0.54, and 0.45, respectively). The three government stakeholder characteristics and self/peer
expertise/trustworthiness were also strongly correlated with warning confidence (r = 0.61, 0.55,
0.31, and 0.34, respectively), perceived forecast accuracy (r = 0.46, 0.44, 0.24, and 0.28,
respectively), and utilization of traditional media (r = 0.35, 0.32, 0.17, and 0.30, respectively). All
stakeholder characteristics except government protection responsibility were significantly
correlated with utilization of new media (r = 0.33, 0.34, 0.11, and 0.29, respectively) and none of
the stakeholder characteristics were significantly correlated with meeting attendance (average r =
0.08) or with response actions (average r = 0.03).
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Forecast accuracy was significantly correlated with warning confidence (r = 0.48) and both
were correlated with traditional media (r = 0.28 and 0.38, respectively) and new media (r = 0.26
and 0.33, respectively), but not meeting attendance (r = 0.10 and 0.10, respectively). Moreover,
only forecast accuracy was significantly correlated with any of the response actions (insurance
review r = 0.17). Meeting attendance had significant correlations with traditional media (r = 0.56),
as well as evacuation preparations and insurance review (r = 0.21 and 0.23, respectively), and
insurance review was also significantly correlated with traditional media and new media (r = 0.17
and 0.24, respectively).
Finally, the response actions tended to be significantly correlated with each other. Most
notably, those who prepared to evacuate or sell their homes were more likely to evacuate or put
their homes on the market (r = 0.32 and 0.56, respectively), as well as to review their insurance
coverage or purchase more insurance (evacuation preparation: r = 0.36 and 0.18, respectively; sale
preparation: r = 0.20 and 0.28, respectively).
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Table 2.5: Means (M), Standard deviations (SD), and correlations (rij) among variables.
Variable
1. Gender
2. Age
3. Ethnicity
4. Income
5. Married
6. HHSize
7. CommBond
8. Volcano
9. HazardZone
10. AnyMeet
11. TradMedia
12. NewMedia
13. GovtExpert
14. GovtTrust
15. GovtProResp
16. NewsExpTr
17. Self/peers
18. WarnConf
19. ForAcc
20. EvacPrep
21. EvacAct
22. SalePrep
23. SaleAct
24. InsRev
25. InsPur
26. HazAdj
Variable
18. WarnConf
19. ForAcc
20. EvacPrep
21. EvacAct
22. SalePrep
23. SaleAct
24. InsRev
25. InsPur
26. HazAdj

M
SD
0.50
0.50
61.71 12.04
0.63
0.48
2.56
1.30
0.59
0.49
2.24
1.51
3.91
0.87
0.48
0.50
2.07
1.03
0.40
0.49
2.87
1.30
2.71
1.36
3.82
0.94
3.97
0.95
3.53
1.34
3.70
1.03
3.56
0.95
4.05
1.00
3.39
1.11
0.21
0.41
0.04
0.19
0.04
0.19
0.02
0.13
0.27
0.44
0.03
0.16
0.10
0.18
18
19 20
.48
.01 -.01
.02 -.08 .32
.03 -.01 .21
.05 -.07 .12
.11
.17 .36
-.01 -.04 .18
.07
.04 .73

1
-.21
-.09
.00
-.03
.08
.05
-.02
-.05
-.09
.07
.09
.04
.02
.11
.01
.05
-.05
-.01
.12
-.03
.08
.04
.02
.05
.09
21

.24
.38
.09
.13
.50

2
.15
-.11
-.02
-.28
.07
-.03
-.06
.00
.04
-.13
.01
-.02
-.05
.02
-.01
.03
.03
-.03
-.02
-.08
-.07
-.04
-.08
-.03
22

.56
.20
.28
.55

3

4

5

.00
-.03
.37
-.19
.20
.33
-.09
.01
.13
-.01
.03 -.01
.02 -.08 -.04
.05
.06
.19
-.18 -.06 -.01
-.05
.00
.00
-.05 -.01
.06
.01
.02 -.01
.02
.06
-.16
-.13 -.05
.01
-.12 -.03
.04
.04
.05
.07
.02
.03
.00
.04 -.07
.00
-.11 -.14
.01
-.04
.00
.01
-.08
.02
.02
.02
.12
.09
.01
.09
.02
.01
.02
.03
23
24
25

.14
.21
.47

.24
.71

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

.14
.07
.03
.04
-.01
-.02
.08
.07
.09
.08
.11
.01
.04
-.01
-.08
.01
.00
.05
-.03
.01

-.06
-.12
.08
.11
.12
.27
.19
.11
.24
.24
.19
.09
.03
.03
-.05
-.04
.03
-.04
.03

-.50
-.01
-.22
-.25
-.10
-.09
-.01
-.09
-.15
-.10
-.14
-.01
.12
-.01
.00
-.10
-.03
-.03

-.01
.27
.14
.14
.12
-.01
.11
.08
.15
.19
.09
.04
-.01
-.01
.11
.02
.09

-.03
.17
.05
.08
.10
.07
.07
.10
.10
.21
.07
.07
-.02
.23
.12
.26

.56
.35
.32
.17
.38
.30
.28
.38
.10
.01
.01
.02
.17
.02
.14

.33
.34
.11
.23
.29
.26
.33
.13
-.02
.02
.02
.24
.06
.19

.71
.41
.78
.50
.61
.46
.02
.00
.04
.04
.09
-.04
.05

.39
.74
.54
.55
.44
-.02
-.06
.01
.01
.09
-.07
.02

.42
.45
.31
.24
.07
.03
.08
.05
.10
.04
.12

.54
.54
.41
-.06
.02
.02
.05
.03
-.05
-.01

.34
.28
.07
.04
.02
.01
.12
-.08
.09

.47
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Correlations in bold are significant at p < .01
Note: 207 ≤ N ≤ 408. Gender (Female = 1; Male= 0), Ethnicity (White = 1; Other=0), Income (Less than $25,000=1; $25,001-$50,000=2;
$50,001-$75,000=3; $75,001-$100,000=4; Over $100,000=5), Married (Married=1; Not married=0), HHSiz = Household size, CommBond =
Community bondedness, Volcano (Mauna Loa= 1; Kīlauea = 0), GovtExpert = Agency and officials expertise, GovtTrust = Agency and officials
trustworthiness, GovProResp = Agency and officials protection responsibility, NewsExpTr = News media expertise and trustworthiness, Self/peers
= Self and peers expertise, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility, WarnConf = Warning confidence, AnyMeet = Attended any community
meetings, TradMedia = Traditional media, NewMedia = New media, ForAcc = Past/future forecast accuracy, EvacPrep = Prepared to evacuate
home, EvacAct = Actually evacuated home, SalePrep = Prepared to put home up for sale, SaleAct = Actually put home up for sale, InsRev =
Review insurance coverage, InsPur = Purchase or increase insurance. HazAdj= Overall hazard adjustment.
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4.3 Regression Analysis. Results from the regression analysis are presented in Table 2.6,
the left panel of which presents the results from regressing the overall measure of hazard
adjustment (HazAdj) onto the first 18 variables in the correlation analysis. The only significant
predictor was whether the respondent attended any of the public meetings (AnyMeet), so the
equation was re-estimated with AnyMeet as the only predictor. This produced b = 0.09, SE(b) =
0.02, β = 0.26, t = 73.10, p < .000, R2 = 0.07, adjusted R2 = 0.06, F1,212 = 14.89, p < .000). One
limitation of this analysis is that the meetings were only held at Kīlauea, so all Mauna Loa
respondents necessarily had missing data for the analysis. Consequently, HazAdj was reanalyzed
deleting AnyMeet from the variable list. The results in the second panel of Table 6 show that
NewMedia was the best predictor. Consequently, the regression equation was re-estimated with
that variable as the only predictor. This produced b = 0.02, SE(b) = 0.01, β = 0.19, t = 3.85, p <
.000, R2 = 0.04, adjusted R2 = 0.03, F1,398 = 14.84, p < .000).
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Table 2.6: Regression analysis results.
Variable
Gender
Age
Ethnicity
Income
Married
HHSize
CommBond
VolcanoSite
HazardZone
GovtExpert
GovtTrust
GovtProResp
NewsExpTr
Self/peers
WarnConf
ForAcc
AnyMeet
TradMedia
NewMedia
Constant

b
.04
.00
-.01
.02
.00
.01
.02

SE
.03
.00
.01
.01
.03
.01
.02

.00
-.00
-.01
.02
-.03
.01
.02
.00
.09
.01
-.00
.80

.02
.03
.03
.01
.03
.02
.02
.02
.03
.01
.01
.15

Model 1
Beta
t
.11 1.41
.04
.46
-.11 -1.29
.11 1.22
.00
.00
.04
.47
.11 1.32
.02
-.00
-.05
.13
-.15
.06
.08
.00
.27
.09
-.01

Sig.
.16
.65
.20
.22
.99
.64
.19

.22
-.03
-.41
1.43
-1.02
.64
.89
.08
3.42
.96
-.06
5.38

.82
.98
.68
.16
.31
.53
.38
.94
.00
.34
.95
.00

R2 =.18;
Adjusted R2 = .08;
F = 1.86;
Degrees of freedom = 171

b
.02
.00
-.00
.00
.02
.00
.01
-.04
.01
.00
-.01
.01
-.02
.00
.01
-.00
.00
.02
.97

Model 2
SE
Beta
.02
.08
.00
.01
.00
-.04
.01
.00
.02
.05
.01
.02
.01
.06
.02
-.12
.01
.03
.02
.00
.02
-.06
.01
.10
.02
-.10
.01
.02
.01
.04
.01
-.01
.01
.01
.09

.03
.12

t
1.37
.22
-.76
.03
.76
.26
.94
-1.56
.46
.04
-.64
1.57
-.94
.33
.57
-.12

Sig.
.17
.83
.45
.97
.45
.79
.35
.12
.65
.97
.52
.12
.35
.74
.57
.91

.44
1.75
10.70

.66
.08
.00

R2 =.08;
Adjusted R2 = .02;
F = 1.47;
Degrees of freedom = 340

5. Discussion
5.1 Analysis of Stakeholder Profiles. The analysis of stakeholders expertise revealed a
hierarchy in which federal, state, and local government agencies were presumed to be the most
knowledgeable; news media, self/family, and local elected officials were the next most
knowledgeable; and state elected officials and peers were least knowledgeable. These results are
somewhat similar to studies of seismic hazards by Lindell and Whitney (2000) and Arlikatti et al.
(2007). However, the results are quite different from those of the Apatu et al. (2015) study of
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tsunami hazards in another Pacific island population— American Samoa. However, with regard
to the Hawai‘i and American Samoa studies, in Hawai‘i, volcano warnings and hazards are
managed locally by the USGS HVO and Hawai‘i County Civil Defense. Traditionally, these two
agencies have enjoyed a very strong presence in the community because of the frequency of hazard
activity and communications with stakeholders about them. In contrast, tsunami warnings are
relatively infrequent in American Samoa and derive in part from a very distant warning center in
Honolulu.
The ratings for volcano stakeholder trustworthiness revealed a relatively similar pattern to that
of expertise, which replicates the findings of both Arlikatti et al. (2007) and Apatu et al. (2015).
The similarity of the patterns of ratings for expertise and trustworthiness should not be
misinterpreted to mean that the respondents could not distinguish between these two stakeholder
characteristics because there were significant, though small, differences in the mean ratings. The
differences suggest that these characteristics are inferred from slightly different information such
as the stakeholders’ credentials (e.g., job title and formal education), treatment by respected
sources, and past history of job performance (Lindell and Perry, 1992, p. 178). In particular,
perceptions of job performance might be a function of the characteristics of the message these
information sources transmit—consistency, accuracy, clarity, perceived confidence and certainty,
guidance clarity concerning protective actions to be taken, and message frequency (Peek and
Mileti, 2002).
The ratings for protection responsibility also have some similarities and differences with
previous studies (Ballentyne et al., 2000; Gregg et al., 2004a; Gregg et al., 2004b). The Hawai‘i
volcano respondents rated self/family as more responsible than government agencies; the latter as
more responsible than news media and elected officials; and peers as least responsible. Lindell and
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Whitney (2000) found that self was considered to have the greatest protection responsibility,
followed by government agencies and family, and that peers had the lowest levels. Moreover,
Arlikatti et al. (2007) found self/family were considered more responsible than government, which
was considered more responsible than news media, employers, and peers. Apatu et al. (2015) also
found that self was most responsible, but that peers were next most responsible, followed by news
media, and last by government officials. As with expertise and trustworthiness, the explanation for
the differences among the studies cannot be determined unequivocally, but the much higher ratings
of protection responsibility for peers than government agencies in the Samoan study is consistent
with the close-knit extended family structure of Samoan society (Apatu et al., 2015) compared to
what appears to exist in the Hawai‘i study areas.
5.2 Correlation Analysis Results. Although the response actions in this study are very different
from the hurricane evacuation studies that Baker (1991) and Huang (2016) reviewed, and
somewhat different from those addressed in the broader set of hazard adjustment studies that
Lindell (2013) reviewed, the conclusions about the effects of demographic variables are similar.
That is, demographic variables have weak and inconsistent correlations with responses to the
imminent threat at Kīlauea and the long-term hazard at Mauna Loa. This suggests that authorities
can rely on communication strategies that target the risk area population as a whole rather than
devoting resources to developing audience segmentation strategies that target specific
demographic groups.
Community bondedness was significantly correlated with ratings of government
expertise/trustworthiness, indicating that those who felt more closely linked to their communities
also thought government authorities were more credible information sources. Community
bondedness was also significantly correlated with ratings of news media expertise/trustworthiness,
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as well as with self/peer expertise/trustworthiness/protection responsibility and warning
confidence. Despite these significant correlations, it was not significantly correlated with
utilization of any of the three information channels— community meetings, traditional media, or
new media. This is somewhat puzzling because Table 2-5 shows that the stakeholder
characteristics (Variables 12-16) were significantly correlated with information channel utilization
(Variables 10-11).
Volcano site (i.e., Kīlauea vs. Mauna Loa subgroups) displayed a very different pattern from
community bondedness. Kīlauea respondents indicated greater utilization of traditional and new
media channels than those at Mauna Loa.

They also had higher ratings of self/peers’

expertise/trustworthiness/protection responsibility, and had greater confidence in forecast
accuracy than Mauna Loa residents. In part, these results are a likely result of Kīlauea residents
having dealt with a recent lava crisis, whereas those at Mauna Loa were only facing an elevated
alert at the time of the survey. Moreover, there had not been an eruption of Mauna Loa in the study
area since 1950 and no one had experienced a Mauna Loa lava flow since the most recent eruption
in 1984. Moreover, only 21% of the Mauna Loa residents had even been living in their
communities during the latter eruption, so it is unsurprising to see higher perceptions of
stakeholders’ expertise and trustworthiness in Kīlauea’s hazard zones than in Mauna Loa’s hazard
zones. Another relevant consideration is that Kīlauea residents had an opportunity to attend
community-wide meetings with government authorities in 2014, unlike those at Mauna Loa. Thus,
it is unsurprising that Kīlauea residents provided mean ratings for the accuracy of lava flow
forecasts in the past that were higher than those for the perceived accuracy of future forecasts in
the future at Mauna Loa. These results are consistent with findings at Mt. St. Helens that a past
history of positive experience with authorities was a significant basis for residents’ perceptions of
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the expertise and trustworthiness of government authorities (Lindell and Perry, 1992, p. 178).
However, from a volcanological perspective, once vents are established and determine the source
of lava flows, the higher slopes in the study area of Mauna Loa (e.g., 8 degrees) compared to those
at Kīlauea (e.g., less than 3 degrees) could contribute to more accurate lava flow forecasts.
Although one significant impediment to this is the uncertainty in whether or not flows bifurcate
along the SWRZ.
Hazard zone results supported findings from Lindell and Hwang (2008) who found that
proximity to hazard sources affects respondents’ risk perceptions via higher levels of information
dissemination in those areas at highest risk. In this study, respondents’ in the lower hazard zones
showed significantly lower ratings for both information sources— traditional and new media.
However, proximity to a hazard does not necessarily lead to accurate levels of risk perception
(Lindell and Hwang, 2008; Wei and Lindell, 2017). It should also be noted that respondents in
higher hazard zones at Kīlauea had greater confidence in forecasting accuracy.
Given the effort that government authorities put into the community meetings on Kīlauea, it is
interesting to find that attendance at such meetings had no significant correlations with perceptions
of government expertise, trustworthiness, or protection responsibility. However, attendance at
community meetings did have the highest correlation with overall hazard adjustment—especially
with insurance review and evacuation preparation. Of course, given the cross-sectional nature of
these data, it is not possible to determine the direction of causality for this correlation (Lindell,
2008). One possible explanation is that attendance at meetings might have prompted people to
review insurance and prepare to evacuate. This is not surprising since conversations at times
focused on insurance and the moratorium. In one instance, a community member adamant about
not diverting the lava flow suggested that the audience should focus on reviewing their home
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owner’s insurance policy and preventing damage by fire. However, property is not insured against
destruction by lava, but rather by fire caused by the lava. Another possibility is that their insurance
reviews and evacuation preparations might have led them to attend the meetings to obtain further
information. Finally, all three activities (meeting attendance, insurance review, and emergency
preparedness) might have been stimulated by some other variable.
Community meeting attendance was not significantly correlated with either traditional or new
media, but that should not be misinterpreted to mean that the community meetings had no effect
on dissemination of lava flow information through either of those two types of channels. Instead,
the low correlations among the information channels suggest that the community meetings served
as a useful channel of information for those residents who tended not to rely on these other two
information channels. That is, the community meetings were an important supplement to the
traditional media (TV, radio, and newspaper) and new media (internet web sites and social media).
Utilization of traditional media was strongly correlated with utilization of new media (r =
0.56), which contrasts with a rather widespread impression that these two types of channels appeal
to completely different audiences. Part of the explanation might be that three of the items in the
new media scale were websites (one item for TV, radio, and newspaper websites; one for the USGS
HVO website; and one for the Hawai’i Civil Defense website), whereas the fourth item referred
only to social media (in general) rather than individual channels such as Facebook and Twitter or
blog sites, which were commonly used during the Kīlauea crisis. Consequently, future studies may
attempt to distinguish among the different types of “new media” to determine if different forms of
social media create a type of communication channel that is distinct from internet usage.
In any event, traditional and new media channels were both significantly correlated with all of
the perceived stakeholder characteristics scales (average r = 0.28). One interpretation of this
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finding is that people who had higher perceptions of stakeholders’ expertise and trustworthiness
were more likely to utilize these channels. This would seem quite plausible for perceptions of news
media expertise/trustworthiness and, possibly, government expertise and trustworthiness.
However,

this

would

not

explain

the

equally

high

correlations

with

self/peer

expertise/trustworthiness/protection responsibility. Instead, it seems more likely that causation is
in the other direction—traditional and new media channels tended to convey a consistent story
about the predictability of the lava flow threat and appropriate responses to that threat. This widely
disseminated information, in turn, increased local residents’ perceptions of the expertise of
government authorities, the news media with whom these authorities shared their information, and
the local residents who received that information through the traditional and new media sources.
The conclusion about the media and stakeholder correlations in the preceding paragraph is
further supported by the significant positive correlations of stakeholder characteristics with
forecast accuracy and warning confidence. The results for forecast accuracy, which addressed
locations affected, as well as arrival times and lava amounts at those locations, indicate that the
high ratings of government and news media expertise/trustworthiness are not just superficial
endorsements; Kīlauea residents’ ratings of these characteristics in the survey are related to their
positive assessments of government and news media during the 2014-2015 lava flow crisis. This
is particularly welcome news given the great uncertainties HVO scientists faced during the Kīlauea
crisis— this was the longest Kīlaeua lava flow in the last 500 years, and the only one that travelled
significant distances in underground cracks and then reemerged to continue flowing overland (see
Poland et al., 2016)
The explanation for the Mauna Loa residents is a bit more indirect than for Kīlauea residents,
but it is quite plausible that their ratings of forecast accuracy for future volcanic crises are based
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on their positive assessments of government and news media during Kīlauea’s 2014-15 lava flow
crisis. Mauna Loa residents not being directly affected by the Kīlauea crisis could explain why
they had slightly lower evaluations of forecast accuracy (r = -0.14). Equally important is that
assessments of forecast accuracy were significantly correlated with confidence in the quality of
future warnings (r = 0.48). Specifically, the respondents expected to receive an accurate forecast
of lava arrival time, a timely official evacuation warning, adequate time for evacuation
preparations, and sufficient time to evacuate to a safe location. Such expectations are high for a
volcano when volcano tremor is only known to have provided between 21 and 115 minutes of
advance warning of an eruption during 20th century eruptions (Gregg et al. 2004b). For some
residents, their proximity to the eruption sources along the SWRZ makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to forecast where and when lava will arrive prior to the establishment of eruptive vents.
While USGS HVO interpret the current unrest indicators as indicative of an eruption on the SWRZ,
eruptions often start high on the rift and propagate down rift, but this takes time to forecast, adding
greatly to the complexity of providing early predictions of the paths lava flows will take.
Surprisingly, this study produced findings that were inconsistent with the seismic studies of
Lindell and Whitney (2000) and Arlikatti et al. (2007). Unlike these other studies, respondents
who viewed themselves and their families as more knowledgeable and trustworthy, as well as more
personally responsible for their own protection, were not more likely to take protective actions
than those without these views. This might be due to the small percentages of respondents who
took protective actions, a condition that produces variance restriction in the dependent variable
and, in turn, attenuation of the correlations of the dependent variable with any of the independent
variables (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).
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As was the case with Arlikatti et al. (2007), ratings of government protection responsibility
had slightly lower correlations with the other two stakeholder characteristics—expertise and
trustworthiness. This provides further support for the idea that perceptions of protection
responsibility have a different basis than perceptions of expertise and trustworthiness. One
possibility is that perceptions of protection responsibility are based on fundamental values such as
individualism (e.g., Hofstede, 2001). Another possibility is that emergency managers have been
effective in conveying the message that, in a major disaster, households will need to be selfsufficient for a week because government agencies will be overwhelmed and unable to help.
5.3 Regression Analysis Results. The regression analysis of Model 1 confirmed the correlation
analysis finding that community meeting attendance was the most important predictor of hazard
adjustment and also showed that traditional and new media utilization did not provide a significant
increment in prediction. However, community meetings were only held in the Kīlauea study area,
so Mauna Loa residents had missing data on that variable. Consequently, Model 2 deleted
community meeting attendance from the variable list and re-estimated the prediction equation.
Consistent with the correlation analyses, the variable with the most significant regression
coefficient was utilization of new media. Thus, the regression analysis results, together with those
from the correlation analyses, are consistent with previous findings that information seeking is a
response to environmental threats that leads to protective actions (Mileti and Fitzpatrick, 1992).
5.4 Study Limitations. Several study limitations were discernible. The sample underrepresented respondents’ in the highest hazard zones and over-represented respondents’ in the
lowest hazard zones, which is unsurprising given the relatively sparse populations in the highest
hazard zones. In other respects, the sample was generally representative of the geographical area
when compared to the American Community Survey (ACS, 2016).
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6. Conclusions
This study examined differences in people’s perceptions of themselves and their families, their
peers, news media, elected officials, and government agencies regarding three characteristics
(hazard expertise, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility) across areas of varying lava flow
hazard and recency at Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes. Respondents rated government agencies
overall as higher in trustworthiness and expertise than other stakeholders. Nonetheless,
respondents rated themselves higher than other stakeholders for protection responsibility.
Community bondedness, utilization of traditional media and new media, and perceptions of
stakeholders were all found to be significantly correlated to high levels (M = 4.05 on a 1-5 scale)
of confidence in warnings of future lava flow threats. However, only attendance at community
meetings (held only at Kīlauea in 2014) and utilization of traditional media and new media were
related to the adoption of hazard adjustments such as preparing to evacuate, reviewing insurance
coverage, and purchasing additional insurance. Moreover, even these actions were relatively rare,
being taken by 21, 27, and 3 percent of the respondents. Percentages of households actually
evacuating (4%), preparing to sell their homes (4%), and putting their homes on the market (2%)
were very small. We note that some at Kīlauea may not have placed their home on the market for
sale because the moratorium would have reduced prospective buyers to only those paying cash
and therefore able to self-insure, since mortgages could not be accommodated without insurance.
This study supports previous research indicating that people generally rely on themselves to
protect their lives and property and have trusted experts from whom they can seek information
while monitoring the onset of hazards such as lava flows (Apatu et al., 2015; Lindell and Perry,
2012; Birkmann et al., 2008). Confidence in the timeliness and accuracy of lava flow forecasts
will allow these residents to prepare for and take protective action when the need arises. But
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government agencies should be careful to avoid promoting residents’ excessively high levels of
confidence in warnings and forecasts when current scientific and emergency management
constraints cannot support such confidence. For example, the study found that residence in areas
of high lava flow hazard correlated with increased perceptions of accurate lava flow forecasts; that
is, those in high hazard zones closest to the source of eruptions were more likely than their
counterparts in areas of lower lava flow hazards to believe USGS would issue accurate lava
forecasts. Of course, having higher confidence is not necessarily the same as excessively high
confidence. In this regard, it is important to note that other research has shown that people
recognize the uncertainty in the forecasts of hurricanes (Wu et al., 2014, 2015) and tornadoes
(Lindell et al., 2016; Jon et al., in press, a, b).
In general, this study showed the relationship between respondents’ confidence in several
events important in decision-making during emergencies. Evacuations were most significantly
correlated with respondents’ past experience with lava forecasts. These included: a) locations
likely to be affected, b) amount of lava expected at those locations, and c) time at which lava would
be expected at these locations. Respondents’ at Kīlauea had a higher mean rating for confidence
in warnings than those at Mauna Loa, which is potentially the result of recent population growth
of non-native residents’ that have had no hazard experience in the past. This supported the
implication of previous findings that past hazard experience has a significant influence on
perceived confidence in warnings. Surprisingly, this study’s findings were inconsistent with those
from Lindell and Whitney (2000) and Arlikatti et al. (2007), which found that respondents who
viewed themselves and their families as more knowledgeable and trustworthy, as well as more
personally responsible for their own protection, were not more likely to take protective actions
than those without these views. However, this might be due to a methodological artifact. This study
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also found the respondents’ community bondedness had a significant influence on their confidence
in warnings and their perceptions of stakeholders.
Future work will continue to improve resilience to eruptions through better understanding of
hazard processes, such as lava flow emplacement processes and perceptions and responses by the
general population. Government officials charged with making decisions about whether
evacuation is warranted must evaluate the risks of unnecessary or delayed evacuations. If they can
make reliable predictions of how individuals and communities respond to information about the
volcanic event and its hazards, along with information about protective actions, including
evacuation in response to warnings, then they will be better prepared to balance those risks.
Similarly, physical scientists have the chance to learn from stakeholders such as policy makers and
residents regarding decision criteria and societal priorities, which may help guide priorities in how
to reduce, treat, and communicate uncertainties.
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CHAPTER 3
RESIDENT PERCEPTIONS OF LAVA FLOW HAZARD DIVERSION STRATEGIES AND
PROTECTIVE MEASURES ON KĪLAUEA AND MAUNA LOA VOLCANOES, HAWAI‘I
Abstract. Public opinion about various volcano hazard mitigation strategies and people’s
willingness to accept additional risk to their personal property in exchange for helping protect
important elements of their community’s infrastructure are poorly understood in volcanology, even
on the island of Hawai‘i where structural attempts to divert lava flows have been tried since 1881.
Perceived characteristics of two common mitigation measures—berms/barriers and bombs were
examined based on perceptions of stakeholders, past crisis experiences, the lava flow hazard zone
in which respondents reside, confidence in warnings, and socio-demographic and cultural factors.
Several eruptions of Kīlauea and Mauna Loa over the last ca. 100 years provided island residents
and agencies with abundant lava flow hazard experience. Earthen barriers, bombs, and water have
been the most common strategies used to date, but a variety of factors outlined by the State Lava
Flow Hazard Technical Committee (2002) mean that such mitigation strategies are unlikely to be
used in future eruptions. And while there are certainly technical and feasibility concerns, this is in
part due to the widespread belief that Hawaiian people oppose interfering in the path of lava. There
were opposing voices over the use of traditional earthen barriers to divert a lava flow that
threatened communities during the recent crisis on Kīlauea in 2014, but there was no opposition
to the electrical authority’s use of relatively small scale structural controls to locally divert lava
around and insulate electric power poles to protect the electrical grid and ensure residents’ access
to electricity. Results of sample survey research on adult resident populations (N= 421) in areas of
high lava flow hazard on Kīlauea’s east rift zone and Mauna Loa’s southwest rift zone indicate
that respondents’ supported earthen berms/trenches more so than bombing/blasting. Additionally,
they were more willing to accept some increased risk to their personal property in exchange for
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protecting critical elements of their community’s infrastructure (i.e. major roads, electric
substations, and schools). However, respondents were less likely to agree to accept some increased
risk to their personal property in exchange for protecting important commercial areas of their
community (i.e. shopping centers).
Understanding the factors that influence public support for, and opposition to, various
mitigation strategies could facilitate official agency decision-making process concerning any
future eruptions where diversion of lava could mitigate lava flow hazards or their impacts.

62

1. Introduction
Lava flows from Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes, Hawai‘i represent significant threats to
property in the southern half of Hawai‘i Island because they burn, inundate, or isolate property.
And although engineered strategies to mitigate lava flows have been tried in Hawai‘i since the late
19th century (Gregg et al., 2004b) and elsewhere in the world as early as the 17th century (i.e. Sicily
in 1669; see Baldwin, 1953), decisions to interfere with the natural path of lava flows in Hawai‘i
are seldom taken because they are constrained by geological, engineering, and logistical factors,
as well as legal, environmental and socio-cultural considerations (Lockwood and Torgerson, 1980;
Gregg et al., 2008). Consequently, understanding how to balance the costs and benefits of
protecting human lives and infrastructure is a major challenge to land-use planning on Hawai‘i
island where speculative land subdivision between 1958 and 1978 (Cooper and Daws, 1990)
contributed to the spread of homes in very remote and isolated areas of the island, many of which
are unpermitted and off the electrical and water grid. Relatively few mitigation actions can be
taken to protect property from lava flows, so it is unsurprising that Murton and Shimabukuro
(1974) reported that evacuation and removal of valuables were the most common hazard
adjustments to eruptions of Kīlauea at that time. But the June 27, 2014 lava flow crisis on Kīlauea
(Poland et al., 2016) involved a slow moving lava flow that provided two local landowners the
opportunity to construct earthen berms with bulldozers and authorities to experiment with various
methods to protect a key road and parts of the electrical grid from the threat of lava inundation.
This study focuses on better understanding Hawai‘i Island residents’ attitudes toward the growing
number of possible strategies which might be used to mitigate lava flow hazards on the island and
protect investments in increasingly expensive infrastructure in remote areas of the island.
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Over 50% of Mauna Loa’s surface has been buried within the past 1,500 years (Lockwood and
Lipman, 1980), posing a lava flow threat to people and property in the political districts of South
Hilo, Puna, Ka‘ū, South Kona, North Kona, and South Kohala (Fig. 3.1). Historical lava flows
have typically emanated from the summit and from vents on the Southwest Rift Zone (SWRZ) and
the Northeast Rift Zone (NERZ), although so-called radial vents on the north and northwest flanks
of the volcano (Trusdell, 1995; Fig. 3.2) have also erupted in historic times. Mauna Loa has had
33 eruptions since 1843. The last eruption was in 1984 and increases in indicators of unrest over
recent years prompted scientists of the US Geological Survey Hawai‘i Volcano Observatory
(USGS HVO) to increase the Volcano Alert level (VAL) from Normal to Advisory in September
2015 (USGS, 2015). Informally, USGS had indicated that the unrest appeared indicative of an
eruption on the SWRZ, which would place people and property in the districts of Ka‘ū and South
Kona at risk. The last eruption in this area of the island was in 1950, so few people today have any
direct experience with eruptions there, where lava flows travel fast due to combinations of steep
slopes and high effusion rates.
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Figure 3.1: Location of volcanoes in study area and the districts of Puna, South Kona, and Ka‘ū (dashed
black line). This figure also shows the USGS lava flow hazard zones.
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Figure 3.2: Map showing lava flows erupted from Mauna Loa within the past 750 years as well as Mauna
Loa’s Southwest Rift Zone (SWRZ), major highways, nearby towns, and the largest residential
subdivision on the island (Hawaiian Ocean View Estates).
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In contrast to Mauna Loa, Kīlauea is one of the world’s most active volcanoes and over 90%
of its surface is covered by lava less than 1,100 years old (Fig. 3.3). Kīlauea has erupted 34 times
since 1952 and almost continuously along its ERZ (Fig. 3.3) since 1983. Additionally, a vent
opened in 2008 at the volcano’s summit crater—Halemaʻumaʻu, which hosts an active lava pond
and a vigorous gas plume. Since 1955, most of the activity has occurred along the East Rift Zone
(ERZ) in rural Puna District or within Hawai‘i Volcanoes National Park (HVNP). Lava flows from
several eruptions since 1955 have caused considerable impacts to private property in lower Puna,
although the on-going Pu‘u‘Ō‘ō eruption since 1983 has mostly affected land inside HVNP. A
recent exception was the June 27, 2014 lava flow, which flowed some 20km from its source,
toward and into the village of Pāhoa in lower Puna District (Poland et al., 2016), prompting a
Presidential Disaster Declaration in November 2014 (Federal Emergency Management Agency,
2015). The declaration allowed federal resources to be used to assist county and state government
in responding to the threat of lava inundation and isolation. Additionally, activity at Pu‘u‘Ō‘ō
shifted downrift in May 3, 2018 from a point source to fissure source eruption, causing destruction
of property and prompting yet another Presidential Disaster Declaration (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2018) on May 11.
It is worthy to note that just two weeks prior to the beginning of the lava flow crisis on Kīlauea
in late August 2014 (i.e., when USGS issued a press release stating that the lava flow could be a
concern to people in Puna and community meetings began being held), the area of lower Puna
affected by the threat of lava inundation and isolation was also severely affected by a hurricane
that made landfall as Tropical Storm Iselle on August 8, 2014 (National Hurricane Center, 2014).
In addition to coastal erosion, wind damage caused exotic Albizia trees with broad canopies to
snap under high wind shear. The downing of Albizias blocked roads and fell utility power poles
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and electrical lines across much of the southern half of the island, exacerbating direct damages to
structures (National Hurricane Center, 2018). The extensive damage prompted a Presidential
Disaster Declaration (Federal Emergency Management Agency DR-4194, 2014). When the lava
flow crisis began, residents demanded from elected and appointed officials during community
meetings that roads, internet, cell-phone and electricity be maintained. This may have proved to
be an important factor in the way residents viewed some subsequent lava flow mitigation actions
carried out during the eruption in 2014.
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Figure 3.3: Map showing lava flows from Kīlauea within the past 750 years as well as Kīlauea’s East Rift
Zone (ERZ), Hwy 130 (gray line), Railroad Avenue (orange line), Government Beach Road
(green line), Chain of Craters Road (blue line), and the location of the central down of Pahoa.
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This study aims to better understand public opinion and factors influencing, various mitigation
strategies that have been used on the island and whether or not residents would accept additional
risk to their personal property in exchange for helping protect important elements of their
community’s infrastructure.
2. Background
Several eruptions of Kīlauea and Mauna Loa over the last ca. 100 years have provided island
residents and agencies with abundant lava flow hazard experience. Earthen barriers, bombs and
water have been the most common strategies used to date. However, decisions to implement
mitigation strategies using public resources are complex and involve consideration of many
factors, including legal, environmental, and feasibility (i.e., technical) considerations, in addition
to cultural factors (Lockwood and Torgerson, 1980; Hawaii County Civil Defense, 2002; Gregg
et al., 2008).
2.1 Mitigation efforts in the past. The earliest known attempt to influence the path of lava
occurred in 1669 on Mount Etna, Italy and involved digging a trench to divert the lava (Baldwin,
1953). But in Hawai‘i, the first known example of engineered measures to mitigate lava flow
hazards was a hand-built stone wall constructed hastily during the 1880–1881 eruption of Mauna
Loa that threatened a sugar mill in Hilo (Baldwin, 1953). Bombs were used to disrupt Mauna Loa
lava flows advancing on Hilo in 1935 and again in 1942 (Jaggar, 1936a,b; Finch and Macdonald,
1949; Lockwood and Torgerson, 1980). Later, in 1955, residents used bulldozers to construct
earthen barriers to protect their private property during an eruption of Kı̄ lauea (Macdonald and
Eaton, 1955) and in 1960 the state organized barriers to protect the village of Kapoho and a US
Coast Guard facility (Macdonald, 1962). Permanent barriers to protect Hilo have long been
proposed (Macdonald, 1958), but have never been constructed. However, a barrier was constructed
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in the mid-1980s high on the north flank of Mauna Loa to protect a weather observatory (Moore,
1982), but it has yet to be tested in an eruption. Water has also been used extensively during
Hawaiian eruptions dating from at least 1955 and 1960 into the 1980s–1990s (Pierce, 1960;
Wilhelm, 1960a; Macdonald, 1962; Gregg, 2005). A State of Hawai‘i Lava Flow Hazard Technical
Committee report (Hawai‘i State Civil Defense, 2002) discussed the possibility of using
engineered measures to divert future lava flows in high risk areas. The report highlighted concern
that liability, reliability, funding, and cultural issues could prevent the use of such measures in the
future (see also Gregg et al., 2008). The report also described how, for example, decisions to
mitigate lava flows may be based partly on expert scientific opinion, but that public opposition
might be sufficient to prevent it.
2.2 Recent mitigation measures. On June 27, 2014, a new vent on Pu‘u‘Ō‘ō opened on Kīlauea,
allowing lava to flow northeast toward the town of Pāhoa rather than south as it had for most of
the eruption since 1983. Pāhoa had about 945 residents (U.S Census Bureau, 2010). Local
businessmen constructed earthen berms to protect their property while the local utility authority
constructed novel structures around electric utility poles to protect the flow of electricity to public
and private property. Local authorities also analyzed and tested alternative strategies for
maintaining the flow of vehicular traffic over an active lava tube system, although no method was
actually employed.
One major cause for concern was the potential for the advancing lava flow to cross Highway
130, which is the only highway that connects the eastern corner of the island to the rest of the
island, including the city of Hilo some 25-30 km north where most people are employed. This
threat was especially problematic as 260 businesses that provided 1,200 jobs in Puna would have
been isolated (Hawai‘i County Civil Defense, 2015; Fig. 3.3. Such isolation would not only have
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influenced the local economy and local workers, but also critical delivery routes for materials
(Hawai‘i State Civil Defense, 2015). To reduce this vulnerability, the county and state departments
of transportation began grading two existing minor roads (Railroad Avenue and Government
Beach Road) farther downslope from Highway 130 that could serve as alternate evacuation routes
should lava cross Highway 130. Additionally, an extension of Highway 130 inside Hawai‘i
Volcanoes National Park (called Chain of Craters Road) was cleared of several kilometers of lava
emplaced during previous decades.
The Hawai‘i Electric Light Company (HELCO), along with scientists at the USGS HVO, and
University of Hawai‘i at Hilo, devised an innovative three-layer protective jacket and installed it
around utility/electrical poles that were in the path of the June 27, 2014 lava flow, to protect the
poles from contact with lava and hopefully maintain the flow of electricity (Hawai‘i County Civil
Defense, 2015). Only one pole was touched by lava and it burned partially from the base upward,
causing the pole to subside but not fail to maintain the electrical supply.
Besides protecting the utility poles and experimenting with methods to maintain a road across
any long-lived lava tube, additional preparedness measures were taken to support community
members in the event lava crossed Highway 130. These actions included creating redundant
electrical, fire and police services. Commercial businesses closed, as did both public and private
schools, whose students were reassigned to schools outside the affected lava hazard zones.
According to Hawai‘i State Civil Defense (2013), the projected average annualized losses for
lava inundation is about $24 million/year. Consequently, many of the island residents are familiar
with lava flow impacts. And, despite the public debate about barriers to protect relatively large
property (e.g., houses, businesses, police and fire stations and schools), there appeared to be no
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similar public discussion of, let alone opposition to, the new mitigation strategies that protected
the electrical power poles, preserving the electrical grid and supply of electricity.
The Hawai‘i State Civil Defense (2013) stated, “the chief threat to lava flows to property
owners is that the flows may burn structures and bury land in areas where the lava inundation
threat was ignored in development by the private sector and government,” (pp. 46). The State of
Hawai‘i Lava Flow Hazard Technical Committee report (Hawaii State Civil Defense, 2002)
emphasized that cultural opposition to lava flow diversion could alone preclude the use of
engineering strategies (Gregg et al., 2008). Hawaiian cultural sensitivity to proposals for
engineered mitigation of lava flows is linked to belief in Pele, the goddess of volcanoes and one
of the most widely known Hawaiian deities (Nimmo, 1992). Gregg et al. (2008) found that cultural
aspects of mitigation are more complex than had been assumed by previous hazard assessments
and mitigation plans. Specifically, data collected among some 648 island residents during the 1960
eruption of Kīlauea in Kapoho demonstrated a level of support in 1960 for barriers, regardless of
factors such as belief in Pele (Gregg et al., 2008). However, during the 2014-15 lava crisis
residents, expressed mixed opinions. In the end, the only barriers that were built were constructed
by private landowners to protect their private property, rather than by authorities.
2.3 Hazard zonation. Volcanic hazard zonation on the Island of Hawai‘i was first completed
in 1974 (Mullineaux and Peterson, 1974), revised in 1987 (Holcomb, 1987), and then revised again
in 1992 (USGS, 1992). The most recent map divides the island into nine zones, with lava flows
most likely to occur in Zone 1 and least likely in Zone 9 (Fig. 3.1). The probability of future lava
flows varies across the Island of Hawai‘i and is greatest on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa. The southern
half of the island that includes the active volcanoes Kīlauea, Mauna Loa, and Hūalalai is designated
Zones 1 through 6, while Zones 7-9 are found on two volcanoes in the northern half of the island
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that have not erupted in thousands of years. Zone 1 only includes the summits and dual rift zones
of Kīlauea and Mauna Loa (where vents have been repeatedly active in historical times) and Zone
2 is only found adjacent to, and downslope from, Zone 1. Zone 3 is less hazardous than Zone 2
because of greater distance from recently active vents or because elevated topography reduces the
hazard. Zone 4 is restricted to Hūalalai where eruptions are less frequent than at Mauna Loa and
Kīlauea, although the last eruptions were in 1800-1801 (Moore et al., 1987). High topography
reduces the threat in the two other zones—Zone 5 on Kīlauea and Zone 6 on Mauna Loa.
2.4 Socio-demographic characteristics. Individuals with lower income often have challenges
that others do not (Leather, 2014). More people in low income groups reside in areas that are
deemed geographically hazardous because these areas are generally less desirable and hence less
expensive. Also, cultural belief systems that have historical foundations can influence settlement
in certain areas (Gregg et al., 2003).
2.5 Stakeholder perceptions of mitigation measures. Using unpublished data collected from
over 600 island residents across four communities on the island of Hawai‘i during the 1960
eruption in Kapoho, Gregg et al. (2008) found significant differences in attitudes regarding the use
of barriers versus bombs to mitigate lava flow hazards that threatened, and eventually inundated,
the small village of Kapoho on the eastern tip of Hawai‘i Island. There were differences regarding
the use of bombs and those agreeing they would help unload the bombs included those who both
did and did not believe the military should bomb the lava, underscoring the complexity of
understanding people’s reasoning processes in mitigation decisions. Gregg et al. (2008) also found
an overwhelming disparity between expressed support for barriers compared to bombs. People of
both Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian ethnicity showed support for the barriers. There is strong
evidence that risk perception is related to people’s hazard adjustment (Huang et al., 2017; Lindell
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and Whitney, 2000; Lindell et al., 2017; Lindell and Perry, 1992; Lindell and Prater, 2002; Lindell
et al., 2009). Beneficial attributes of mitigation strategies (i.e., their ability to protect people and
property and their usefulness for other purposes) were significantly correlated with people’s
intention to adopt protective actions and actual adjustment (i.e., adoption of protective strategies)
in studies of hazards such as, seismic (Lindell and Prater, 2002; Lindell and Whitney, 2000), flood
(Terpstra and Lindell, 2013), and water contamination (Lindell et al., 2017). In contrast, these
studies have shown that cost-related attributes of mitigation strategies (i.e., their cost, time/effort,
requirement for specialized knowledge/skill and specialized tools/equipment, and social
cooperation) had nonsignificant correlations with intentions to adopt protective actions or actual
adjustments.
2.6 Objective. The goal of this study is to understand public opinions about lava mitigation
strategies such as diversion by berms or bombing—including the effectiveness of these mitigation
strategies for lava flows and other hazards; their financial and legal considerations; and their
requirements for specialized knowledge, skills, and cooperation. People’s acceptance of additional
risk to personal property in exchange for protecting important elements of their community such
as schools, major roads, electrical substation, and shopping centers was also considered, because
it was observed during the 2014 lava flow crisis on Kīlauea that while there were both proponents
for and advocates against the use of lava diversion strategies to protect private, commercial and
public property, there was no indication that anyone spoke up about HELCO’s use of protective
jackets around utility poles. Instead, residents passively accepted HELCO’s efforts to harden parts
of the electrical grid that would help ensure that the flow of electricity was not interrupted by the
lava flow. We evaluate these opinions about mitigation with crisis experience, perceptions of
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stakeholders, perceptions of forecasting accuracy, confidence in warnings, and socio-demographic
characteristics (i.e. marital status, household size, income, and education).
3. Materials and Methods
3.1 Survey procedure. Data used in this study were collected between April and July 2017 from
adult residents 18 years and older of areas on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes. We used two
nearly identical household survey questionnaires. The Kīlauea survey focused on 800 households
in the Puna District, whereas the Mauna Loa survey focused on 800 households in the Districts of
South Kona and Ka‘ū (Fig. 3.1). These 1600 households were randomly selected and spatially
distributed across three hazard zones at Kīlauea and four hazard zones at Mauna Loa that are
illustrated on the HVO lava flow hazard map for the island (USGS, 1992). To increase the
likelihood of equal response rates from males and females and younger and older adults, the survey
cover letter and informed consent document asked that the questionnaire be completed by an adult
person in the household over 18 years of age who most recently had a birthday. Following
Dillman’s (2000) Tailored Design Method, each household was sent an initial questionnaire and
non-respondents were sent a reminder postcard and as many as two replacement questionnaires.
This process was terminated when non-respondents had been sent as many as one reminder
postcard and three questionnaire packets. Some 138 (8.6%) packets were undeliverable and only
one packet was refused. A total of 421 households returned usable questionnaires for a response
rate of deliverable packets 29% (15% from Kīlauea and 14% from Mauna Loa). The present study
included households in lava flow hazard zones 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, although the few respondents (N
= 41) in zone 4 are actually located just off the flank of Mauna Loa and on the southwest flank of
the volcano Hūalalai. Kīlauea zones 1, 2, and 3 were coded 1, 2, and 3, respectively; reflecting
relatively high, moderate, and low hazard ranking. Similarly, Mauna Loa zones 1 and 2 were coded
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1, zone 3 was coded 2, and zones 4 and 6 were coded 3, reflecting relatively high, moderate and
low hazard ranking. Zone 2 was included with zone 1 on Mauna Loa primarily because of the steep
slopes on the volcano, which increase lava flow velocities and corresponding hazards.
Response rates differed significantly with respect to lava flow zonation on both volcanoes—
that is, the rate or return was indirectly proportional to lava flow hazard on Kīlauea, but directly
proportional on Mauna Loa. The number of responses in Kīlauea’s highest hazard zone (Zone 1)
was 8 (3.2%), Kīlauea’s moderate zone (Zone 2) was 53 (21.2%), and Kīlauea’s lowest zone (Zone
3) was 148 (49.3%). The numbers of responses in Mauna Loa’s highest hazard zone (Zones 1 and
2) was 52 (20.8%), Mauna Loa’s moderate zone (Zone 3) was 72 (24%), and Mauna Loa’s lowest
zone (Zones 4 and 6) was 39 (15.6%). Table 3.1 highlights the direct and indirect response rate
proportions for Kīlauea and Mauna Loa and their corresponding hazard zones. The study was
approved by the ETSU Institutional Review Board (#c0117.9sd).
Table 3.1: Comparison of survey return rates on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa by lava flow hazard zone.
Lava Flow Hazard Zone

Total

1 & 2 (ML*) & 1

3 (ML) & 3 (KL)

3 (KL) & 4 & 6

(KL*) (high); N

(moderate)

(ML) (low)

(%)

N (%)

N (%)

Kīlauea

8 (2.2)

53 (14.2)

148 (39.8)

209

Mauna

52 (14.0)

72 (19.4)

39 (10.5)

163

60 (16.2)

125 (33.6)

187 (50.3)

372

Loa
Total

* ML= Mauna Loa; KL= Kīlauea
3.2 Measures.
3.2.1 Dependent variables. The questionnaire contained two items that measured respondents’
perceptions of two very different mitigation strategies that involve the use of: 1) bombs and
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blasting and 2) barriers (i.e., berms) or trenches. Limited space prevented us from asking questions
about the use of water, but we characterize the two sets of mitigation measures into attributes that
make them beneficial (i.e., benefit-related attributes—a, b, and c below) versus those that are
associated with costs (i.e., cost-related attributes—d through h below). We closed the questions by
asking if either of the two mitigation methods were something they would support (i below).
Respondents were asked: “To what extent would diverting lava flows by bombing or blasting” and
“To what extent would diverting lava flows by constructing earthen berms or trenches”:
a) protect persons very effectively;
b) protect property very effectively;
c) also be useful for purposes other than volcano protection;
d) cost a lot of money;
e) create other problems such as lawsuits;
f) require specialized knowledge and skill;
g) require a lot of effort;
h) require a lot of cooperation from others;
i) be something you would support?”
The items were all anchored by a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Not at all” (= 1) to “Very
great extent” (=5). To help understand public opinion about various mitigation strategies and
mitigation towards specific critical infrastructure and people’s acceptance of additional risk to
personal property to help protect important elements of their community, respondents were asked:
“To what extent would you accept some increased risk to your home if authorities tried to divert a
lava flow from a(n):
a) school;
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b) major road;
c) electric substation;
d) shopping center?”
Again, the items were all anchored by a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Not at all” (= 1) to
“Very great extent” (=5). A multi-item scale with an internal consistency reliability of Cronbach’s
α = .92 was created for each respondent by computing the mean scores across the four sub-items
(school, major road, electric substation, and shopping center). These four items were included in
the measure because of their importance during the 2014 lava flow crisis.
3.2.2 Independent variables. Respondents rated five stakeholder groups—federal, state, and
local agencies; news media; state and local elected officials; peers; and their immediate family—
with respect to three characteristics. These were 1) hazard expertise: “To what extent do you think
the following individuals or organizations are knowledgeable about Kīlauea [Mauna Loa] lava
flows?”; 2) trustworthiness: “To what extent do you think each of the following is willing to
provide you with accurate information about Kīlauea [Mauna Loa] lava flows?”; and 3) protection
responsibility: “To what extent do you think each of following is responsible for protecting you
from Kīlauea [Mauna Loa] lava flows?” The items were all anchored by a five-point Likert scale
from “Not at all” (=1) to “Very great extent” (=5). Based on the results of a factor analysis that
identified five factors, three scales were created using the mean scores of stakeholders (federal,
state, and local agencies, state and local elected officials) based on their perceived: a)
trustworthiness (α = .91); b) expertise (α = .92); and c) protection responsibility (α = .95). In
addition, two scales were created using the mean scores of: d) news media based on their perceived
trustworthiness and expertise (α = .74) and e) the respondents themselves, their immediate family,
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and their peers based on their perceived trustworthiness, expertise, and protection responsibility
(α = .82).
Respondents were also asked to indicate their confidence in four aspects of warnings and
response to future volcanic activity: “How likely do you think it is that each of the following will
happen after a lava flow begins but before your home is threatened: a) you will receive an accurate
forecast of lava arrival time, b) you will receive an official evacuation warning, c) you can prepare
to evacuate, and d) you can prepare to evacuate to a safe location?” These items were all anchored
by a five-point Likert scale from “Extremely unlikely” (=1) to “Extremely likely” (=5) and
averaged to create a scale with α = .87.
Additionally, people’s perceptions of the accuracy of previous lava flow forecasts at Kīlauea
and future forecasts at Mauna Loa were evaluated by asking the Kīlauea sample: “How accurate
do you think the lava flow forecasts during the June 2014-2015 lava flow crisis in Puna were with
respect to...” For the Mauna Loa sample, we asked: “How accurate do you think lava flow forecasts
will be during any future eruption of Mauna Loa with respect to…” Referents were: a) locations
to be affected, b) amount of lava expected at those locations and c) time at which lava would arrive
at those locations. A scale with α = .90 was constructed by computing the mean scores for the
three referents.
To assess respondents’ demographic characteristics, respondents were asked their marital
status: married, single, divorced, or widowed, which was recoded to “married” (= 1) and “not
married” (= 0). Respondents were also asked, “How many people in your household are: Less than
18 years, 18-65 years, over 65 years” (for subsequent analyses, the total number of people in the
household was used rather than by age group). Respondents were asked to describe their yearly
household income before taxes: less than $25,000 (= 1), $25,001-$50,000 (= 2), $50,001-$75,000
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(= 3), $75, 001-$100,000 (= 4), or over $100,000 (= 5). The respondents’ highest level of education
was also assessed: elementary school (grades 1-6 = 1), Junior High or Middle School (grades 7-8
= 2), High School (grades 9-12 = 3), College Degree (2 or 4 year degree = 4), or Graduate Degree
(Masters, Ph.D., etc. = 5).
3.3 Statistical Analysis. Paired sample t-tests were used to assess the differences between
perceptions of bombing/blasting and earthen berms/trenches as mitigation measures. Pearson
correlations were used to assess the degree of association among the independent and dependent
variables. The experiment-wise error rate was controlled by setting a conservative significance
level of p ≤ .01. All analyses were conducted in SPSS Version 23 and ArcGIS.
4. Results
4.1 Differences between perceptions of bombing/blasting and earthen berms/trenches. Table
3.2 shows the mean ratings and standard deviations for the different items described in Section
3.2.1. With respect to protecting person and property very effectively, respondents rated
berms/trenches higher then bombing/blasting (t393 = -9.28, p < .01; t393 = -10.00, p < .01,
respectively). Respondents’ also rated berms/trenches higher than bombing/blasting for being
useful for purposes other than volcano protection (t382 = -10.18, p < .01) and something they would
support (t392 = -9.40, p < .01). With regards to creating problems such as lawsuits and requiring
specialized knowledge or skill, respondents rated bombing/blasting higher than earthen
berms/trenches (t395 = 4.92, p < .01; (t396 = 5.07, p < .01, respectively). There were no significant
differences on cost, effort, and cooperation.
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Table 3.2. Mean ratings for beliefs, attitudes towards bombing/blasting and berms/trenches (Mean ±
SD)

Bombing/blasting

Berms/trenches

1.84 ± 1.13
1.84 ± 1.09

2.37 ± 1.23
2.39 ± 1.22

1.71 ± 1.07

2.35 ± 1.25

4. cost a lot of money

3.86 ± 1.38

3.74 ± 1.24

5. create other problems such as lawsuits

3.95 ± 1.33

3.64 ± 1.31

6. require specialized knowledge and skill
7. require a lot of effort
8. require a lot of cooperation from others
9. be something you would support

4.25 ± 1.25

3.96 ± 1.20

3.94 ± 1.33

4.01 ± 1.18

4.18 ± 1.25
2.15 ± 1.38

4.09 ± 1.16
2.81 ± 1.48

Benefit-related attributes (1-3)
1. protect persons very effectively
2. protect property very effectively
3. also be useful for purposes other than
volcano protection
Cost-related attributes (4-8)

Note: Bolded text denotes a significant difference
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4.2 Correlation analysis.
4.2.1 Correlations among attributes. As indicated in Table 3.3 below, there were strong
positive correlations among the three benefit-related attributes (i.e., protect persons effectively,
protect property effectively, useful for other purposes) for both bombing/blasting (average r = .77)
and berms/trenches (average r = .73). In addition, there were also strong positive correlations
among the cost-related attributes (i.e., cost a lot of money, create other problems, require
specialized knowledge, require a lot of effort, and require a lot of cooperation) for both
bombing/blasting (average r = .70) and berms/trenches (average r = .71). Moreover, there were
strong positive correlations among the three benefit-related attributes for bombing/blasting with
those for berms/trenches (average r = .27) and strong positive correlations among the five costrelated attributes for bombing/blasting with those for berms/trenches (average r = .63). Finally, the
correlations of three benefit-related attributes with support for bombing/blasting (average r = .60)
and berms/trenches (average r = .62) were much larger than the corresponding correlations of the
five cost-related attributes (average r = .18 and .24, respectively).
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Table 3.3. Means (M), Standard deviations (SD), and correlations (rij) among variables.
Variable

M

SD

1

2

3

1. Married
2. HHSize
3. Ethnicity

0.59
2.24
0.63

0.50
1.15
0.43

.33
-.03

-.19

-

4. Income
5. Education
6. GovTrust
7. GovtExpert
8. GovProResp
9. NewsExpTr
10. Self/peers
11. WarnConf
12. ForAcc
13. HazAdj
14. HazZone
15. bombing_1pers
16. bombing_2prop
17. bombing_3useful
18. bombing_4cost
19. bombing_5law
20. bombing_6skill
21. bombing_7effort
22. bombing_8coop
23. bombing_9supp
24. berms_1pers
25. berms_2prop
26. berms_3useful
27. berms_4cost

2.56
3.89
3.97
3.82
3.53
3.70
3.56
4.05
3.39
1.10
2.07
1.84
1.84
1.71
3.86
3.95
4.25
3.94
4.18
2.15
2.37
2.39
2.35
3.74

1.30
0.74
0.95
0.94
1.34
1.03
0.95
1.00
1.11
0.18
1.03
1.13
1.09
1.07
1.38
1.33
1.25
1.33
1.25
1.38
1.23
1.22
1.25
1.24

.37
.04
-.01
.06
.06
.01
.04
.07
-.00
.03
-.04
-.05
-.01
-.04
.03
.04
.04
.05
.04
-.01
-.02
.00
-.08
-.04

.20
-.06
.07
.08
.09
.08
.11
.00
.04
.01
.03
.11
.11
.13
-.04
-.08
-.05
-.06
-.05
.07
.08
.07
.09
.05

.00
.13
.01
-.05
-.16
-.13
-.12
.04
.02
.01
.02
-.10
-.07
-.09
-.11
-.04
-.01
-.05
-.01
.01
-.01
.03
-.04
-.08

28. berms_5law
29. berms_6skill
30. berms_7effort
31. berms_8coop
32. berms_9supp
33. divertprot

3.64
3.96
4.01
4.09
2.81
2.29

1.31
1.20
1.18
1.16
1.48
1.26

.00
-.02
-.06
-.05
-.02
-.07

-.03
-.01
-.01
-.05
.05
.06

-.01
-.06
-.04
-.02
.07
-.16

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

.26
.02
-.01
.02
-.05
-.03
.05
.03
.02
-.08
.03
.07
.04
-.11
-.06
-.02
.01
-.05
.01
-.01
.01
-.06
-.09

-.06
-.09
-.07
-.16
-.12
-.05
-.08
-.02
-.06
-.05
-.02
-.00
-.05
.00
-.03
.04
.01
-.12
-.03
-.03
-.05
-.04

.71
.40
.74
.54
.55
.44
.02
.11
.12
.11
.12
.18
.23
.25
.20
.21
.06
.18
.19
.13
.17

.41
.78
.50
.61
.46
.05
.14
.14
.13
.21
.18
.24
.23
.17
.19
.08
.22
.21
.18
.18

.42
.45
.31
.24
.12
-.01
.22
.21
.19
.08
.11
.14
.15
.13
.17
.16
.15
.13
.12

.54
.54
.41
-.01
.11
.16
.16
.22
.20
.19
.24
.17
.20
.12
.23
.21
.19
.18

.34
.28
.09
.08
.13
.11
.19
.26
.22
.26
.22
.24
.10
.19
.18
.22
.15

.48
.07
.15
.12
.11
.08
.10
.13
.17
.16
.14
.06
.18
.18
.10
.10

.04
.19
.13
.12
.15
.08
.12
.15
.09
.12
.10
.21
.22
.19
-.04

.09
.01
.02
.02
.05
.03
-.05
.02
-.01
-.01
.06
.06
-.01
.06

-.02
-.04
.02
.06
.08
.07
.04
.00
-.03
.06
.07
-.05
-.08

-.05
-.03
-.06
-.06
-.05
-.03

.01
.06
.03
.03
-.11
-.07

.14
.15
.16
.17
.13
.08

.20
.20
.19
.21
.16
.10

.22
.22
.18
.16
.09
.08

.18
.17
.16
.16
.18
.14

.15
.19
.16
.17
.19
.10

.14
.09
.09
.13
.12
.07

.04
.05
.01
.07
.16
.07

.08
.08
.06
.07
.00
.04

-.01
-.09
-.12
-.09
.04
-.07
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Variable
15. bombing_1pers

15

16. bombing_2prop

.92

-

17. bombing_3useful

.67

.71

18. bombing_4cost

-.08

-.01

.03

-

19.bombing_5law

-.14

-.14

-.07

.72

-

.10

.09

.08

.61

.68

-

.00
.06
.70
.58
.55
.41
-.01
-.08
.01
-.02
-.01
.49
.18

-.01
.05
.74
.56
.58
.43
-.02
-.08
.01
-.02
-.02
.52
.17

.04
.05
.56
.49
.46
.50
.03
-.07
.04
-.03
0
.40
.21

.65
.65
-.14
.05
.04
.12
.52
.40
.42
.48
.48
.01
-.08

.65
.70
-.19
-.01
.02
.04
.43
.49
.41
.43
.49
-.05
-.05

.73
.80
.09
.14
.16
.17
.41
.36
.51
.51
.53
.16
.02

20. bombing_6skill
21. bombing_7effort
22. bombing_8coop
23. bombing_9supp
24. berms_1pers
25. berms_2prop
26. berms_3use
27. berms_4cost
28. berms_5law
29. berms_6skill
30. berms_7effort
31. berms_8coop
32. berms_9supp
33. divertprot

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

.78
-.01
.06
.06
.07
.46
.40
.49
.54
.56
.08
.04

.06
.11
.12
.13
.46
.44
.53
.56
.63
.12
-.05

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

.71
.68
.73
.66
-.02
.05

.63
.63
.63
-.10
.03

.83
.78
.06
.03

.85
.07
.08

.13
.06

.21

-

.49
.46
.36
0.01
-.10
-.02
-.06
-.02
.58
.18

.93
.64
.02
-.01
.09
.05
.11
.74
.20

.62
.01
-.02
.06
.04
.10
.73
.15

.03
.01
.15
.09
.10
.58
.27

Correlations in bold are significant at p < .01
Note: 390 ≤ N ≤ 421. Married (Married=1; Not married=0), HHSize = Household size, Ethnicity (White = 1; Other = 0), Income (Less than $25,000=1; $25,001$50,000=2; $50,001-$75,000=3; $75,001-$100,000=4; Over $100,000=5), Education (elementary school (grades 1-6) = 1, Junior High or Middle School (grades
7-8) =2, High School (grades 9-12) = 3, College Degree (2 or 4 year degree) = 4, or Graduate Degree (Masters, Ph.D., etc.) = 5, GovtTrust = Agency and officials
trustworthiness, GovtExpert = Agency and officials expertise, GovProResp = Agency and officials protection responsibility, NewsExpTr = News media expertise
and trustworthiness, Self/peers = Self and peers expertise, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility, WarnConf = Warning confidence, ForAcc = Past/future
forecast accuracy, HazAdj= Overall hazard adjustment, HazZone=hazard zone (1= high, 2=moderate, 3=low), bombing_1pers = protect persons very effectively,
bombing_2prop = protect property very effectively, bombing_4useful = useful for purposes other than volcano protection, bombing_4cost = cost a lot of money,
bombing_5law= create other problems such as lawsuits, bombing_6skill= require specialized knowledge and skill, bombing_7effort= require a lot of effort,
bombing_8coop= require a lot of cooperation from others, bombing_9supp= be something you would support, berms_1pers = protect persons very effectively,
berms_2prop = protect property very effectively, berms_4useful = useful for purposes other than volcano protection, berms_4cost = cost a lot of money,
berms_5law= create other problems such as lawsuits, berms_6skill= require specialized knowledge and skill, berms_7effort= require a lot of effort, berms_8coop=
require a lot of cooperation from others, berms_9supp= be something you would support, diverprot= willingness to accept some increased risk to protect critical
facilities (school, major road, electric substation, or shopping center).
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4.2.2 Bombing/Blasting. Only two of the independent variables—government protection
responsibility and news media expertise/trust—had consistently significant correlations with the
three benefit-related attributes of bombing/blasting (average r = 0.19). However, four of the
independent variables— government trust, government expertise, news media expertise/trust, and
self/peers— had consistently significant (positive) correlations with the five cost-related attributes
of bombing/blasting, but the correlations were relatively weak. None of the variables for
perceptions of stakeholders had a significant correlation with support for bombing/blasting. Only
one of the benefit-related attributes— usefulness for purposes other than volcano protection— had
a significant correlation with forecasting accuracy (r = 0.15). And only one of the cost-related
attributes— the requirement for specialized knowledge or skill, had a significant correlation with
forecasting accuracy (r = 0.15). Forecasting accuracy had no significant correlation with support
for mitigation measures. It is interesting to note that warning confidence had significant but weak
correlations with three of the cost-related attributes (average r = 0.15) but no significant
correlations with the benefit-related attributes. None of the socio-demographic variables had
significant correlations with any perceptions of bombing/blasting. What was most noteworthy was
that the stronger significant correlations with support for bombing/blasting were with all three
benefit-related attributes. The mean for the benefit-related attributes was significantly lower (1.80
± 1.02) than the cost-related attributes (4.04 ± 1.13) (Fig. 3.4).
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1 = "Not atl all" to 5 = "Very great extent"

4.04

3.9
2.81

2.37

2.15

1.8

Figure 3.4: Mean response ratings for the benefit-related and cost-related attributes for both bombs and
berms. Figure also shows mean response ratings for support of both bombs and berms.

4.2.3 Earthen berms/trenches. Four of the independent variables— government expertise,
government protection responsibility, news media expertise/trust, and self/peers— had
consistently significant [positive] correlations with the three benefit-related attributes of
berms/trenches. Four of the independent variables— government trust, government expertise,
news media expertise/trust, and self/peers— had consistently significant correlations with the five
cost-related attributes of berms/trenches.

It was interesting to note that while stakeholder

perceptions had no significant correlations with the support for bombing/blasting, three of these
variables—government expertise, news media trust/expertise, and self/peers— had significant
correlations with the support for earthen berms/trenches. Forecasting accuracy was significantly
correlated with all three benefit-related attributes (r = 0.21, r = 0.22, and r = 0.19, respectively).
Forecasting accuracy had no significant correlation with any of the cost-related attributes but a
relatively weak correlation with support (r = 0.16). Confidence in warnings had significant weak
correlations with two of the benefit-related attributes, protecting persons and property effectively
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(r = 0.18). It was interesting to find that warning confidence had significant correlations with two
of the cost-related attributes— creating other problems such as lawsuits (r = 0.14) and requiring a
lot of cooperation (r = 0.13). None of the socio-demographic variables had significant correlations
with any perceptions of earthen berms/trenches. What is most noteworthy is all three benefitrelated attributes regarding earthen berms/trenches had significant correlations with support (r =
0.74, r = 0.73, and r = 0.58, respectively). The mean for the benefit-related attributes was
significantly lower (2.37 ± 1.11) than the cost-related attributes (3.90 ± 1.07) (Fig. 3.4).
4.2.4 Diversion to protect critical facilities. Only one of the independent variables— news
media expertise/trust— had a significant correlation with acceptance of diversion and some
increased risk (r = 0.14). None of the socio-demographic variables, forecasting accuracy, and
warning confidence had significant correlations with any perceptions of diversion acceptance.
Respondents’ willingness to accept some increased risk to protect critical facilities (i.e. school,
major road, electric substation, or shopping center) was significantly correlated with the three
benefit-related attributes for bombing/blasting as well as earthen berms/trenches. As expected,
support for both mitigation measures were significantly correlated with willingness to accept some
increased risk (r = 0.18 and r = 0.21, respectively). The mean response rating for respondents
willingness to accept increased risk was higher than the overall mean (2.29 ± 1.26) for major road
(2.56 ± 1.49), electrical substation (2.34 ± 1.40) (Fig. 3.5), and schools (2.30 ± 1.42), but not for
shopping centers (1.93 ± 1.30). However, even these two means were below the neutral point in
the rating scale (“3”) and given standard deviation the difference is not significant. What is most
interesting to note is the proportion of respondents’ that were willing to accept, to varying degrees,
some additional risk to their property compared to the respondents’ that were not willing to accept
any additional risk was the highest for protecting major roads (0.62 vs. 0.38), electric substations
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(0.58 vs. 0.42), schools (0.55 vs. 0.45). Shopping centers had the lowest proportion of respondents’
that were willing to accept compared to the respondents’ that were not willing to accept any
additional risk to their own property (0.42 vs. 0.58).

shopping center

Critical facilities

electric substation

major road

school

overall
1

2

3

4

1 = "Not at all" to 5 = "Very great extent"

Figure 3.5: Chart showing the mean response ratings for the three critical infrastructural elements, plus
commercial shopping center.

4.3 Regression analysis. Results from the regression analysis are presented in Table 3.4, the
left panel of which presents the results from regressing the support for bombing/blasting as a
mitigation measure onto its perceived characteristics (Variables 14-21 in correlation analysis). The
only significant predictors were perceived effectiveness to protect property and other problems
created such as lawsuits. This produced b= 0.69, SE(b) = 0.11, β = 0.54, t = 6.00, p < .000, and b
= -0.23, SE(b) = 0.06, β = -.22, t = -3.82, p < .000, respectively. This analysis produced an R2 =
0.58, adjusted R2 = 0.57, F1,376 = 63.87, p < .000. The second panel of Table 3.4 shows results from
regressing the support for earthen berms/trenches as a mitigation measure onto its perceived
characteristics (Variables 23-30 in correlation analysis). The significant predictors were perceived
effectiveness to protect persons and property, usefulness for purposes other than volcano

89

5

protection, and other problems created such as lawsuits. Model 2 produced a R2 = 0.62, adjusted
R2 = 0.61, F1,380 = 74.56, p < .000.
Table 3.4. Regression analysis results.
Variable
b
Protect persons
effectively
Protect property very
effectively
Useful for other
purposes
Cost a lot of money
Create other problems
(lawsuits)
Specialized
knowledge
Lot of effort
Lot of cooperation
Constant

SE

Model 1
Beta
t

Sig.

b

SE

Model 2
Beta

t

Sig.

.08

.11

.07

.79

.43

.44

.11

.37

4.21

.00

.69

.11

.54

6.00

.00

.34

.10

.29

3.25

.00

.15

.06

.12

2.41

.02

.19

.05

.16

3.79

.00

-.08

.05

-.08

-1.41

.16

-.00

.06

-.00

-.03

.97

-.23

.06

-.22

-3.82

.00

-.24

.06

-.21

-4.33

.00

.07

.07

.07

1.10

.27

-.09

.07

-.08

-1.19

.24

.07

.06

.07

1.14

.25

.14

.10

.12

1.49

.14

.13

.07

.07

1.77

.08

.17

.09

.13

1.98

.05

.53

.19

2.78

.00

.46

.20

2.29

.02

R2 =.58;
Adjusted R2 = .57;
F = 63.87;
Degrees of freedom = 376

R2 =.62;
Adjusted R2 = .61;
F = 74.56;
Degrees of freedom = 380

5. Discussion
5.1 Benefit- and cost-related attributes. In general, respondents do not seem to think that either
mitigation measure will be beneficial and will require many resources, more so for
bombing/blasting than for earthen berms/trenches. Many of the strongest correlations are between
the benefit-related attributes for these mitigation measures and the support for those measures. The
rationale for weak correlations of support with the benefit-related attributes for both mitigation
measures is related to recent events— after Tropical Storm Iselle and the June 2014-15 lava crisis,
residents were not ready to deal with the renewed threat of electric power loss. When the lava flow
crisis began in 2014, residents demanded from elected and appointed officials during community
meetings that roads, internet, cell-phone and electricity be maintained. This may have proved to

90

be an important factor in the way residents viewed some subsequent lava flow mitigation actions
carried out during the eruption in 2014.The benefit-related attributes were also the most significant
variables in both models used in an attempt to predict support for lava mitigation measures. Upon
further examination though, the benefit-related attributes for bombing/blasting have significant
relationships with stakeholder characteristics. Specifically, the perception of government
protection responsibility, as well as trust and expertise, and the correlation with the effectiveness
to protect property and persons effectively. But what is most interesting is the correlation between
bombing being something people would support and bombs protecting property and people—
which is much stronger than the corresponding correlation for earthen berms/trenches. This
surprising result suggests that people think bombing could prevent the lava from even being near
them whereas they think if earthen berms/trenches are used then the lava is already near them. This
could potentially reflect their recent experience with Kīlauea. People might have thought Pu‘u‘Ō‘ō
could be bombed causing the lava to flow back south toward the ocean (avoiding lower Puna) or
they could have thought bombing would stop the eruption. Another possibility is that they realized
bombing the lava near the source could make the flow restart its path toward Pāhoa and that maybe
the eruption would end before the front reached near them again. According to Hawai‘i State Civil
Defense (2002) lava diversion barriers are to redirect, not halt, lava flows around a community or
critical infrastructure and therefore, barriers and bombing would have the same effect on diverting
lava. Like Gregg et al. (2008), this study found that socio-demographic variables did not have a
significant relationship with perceptions of bombing/blasting. Moreover, this study supported the
issues identified in the State of Hawai‘i Lava Flow Hazard Technical Committee report (Hawai‘i
State Civil Defense, 2002), which specifically highlighted the concern about liability and funding
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by finding a significant negative correlation with support. However, this relationship was only
found for bombing/blasting, not for berms/barriers.
5.2 Acceptance of additional risk when diverting lava to protect critical facilities. News media
trust and expertise was the only variable that had a significant correlation with diversion
acceptance. Perceptions of trust and expertise of the news media were also correlated with the
three benefit-related attributes for bombing/blasting as well as earthen berms/trenches. So, it is not
surprising that the people who thought bombs and barriers could protect people and property were
more likely to accept some additional risk when diverting or bombing lava to protect critical
facilities. What is interesting is that, while significant, there is not a strong correlation between
support for bombing or barriers and acceptance of additional risk to save critical facilities. The
strongest correlation was with the perception that bombing/blasting could be useful for purposes
other than volcano protection. Perhaps the most interesting finding from this question is that
respondents were more willing to accept some increased risk to their property to protect a major
road, electric substation, and schools, but not shopping centers. This is consistent with people’s
acceptance of HELCO’s responses to Tropical Storm Iselle and the June 2014-15 lava crisis, the
latter of which threatened to isolate part of the Puna district and force the closure of both public
and private schools. This suggests respondents view roads, electrical substations, and schools as
critical infrastructure but do not view shopping centers as critical. Although the largest grocery
store in the Puna district was threatened by the June 2014-15 lava flow, there was another market
in a nearby town that would allowed residents’ access to important commercial goods. On average,
respondents’ were not willing to accept a lot of risk to protect any of the four critical elements in
this study. But they were more likely to accept some for protection of major roads, electrical
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substations, and schools. This suggests that residents’ are willing to accept some degree of risk to
their own property if it means they can protect elements in their community that they deem critical.
6. Conclusion
In general, this study found the strongest correlation between benefit-related attributes of
bombing/blasting and earthen berms/trenches and support for both mitigation measures. Overall,
support for earthen berms/trenches as a mitigation strategy was higher than for bombs/blasting,
which is consistent with the findings of Gregg et al (2008). It is unsurprising that people who
support either mitigation effort were more likely to accept some additional risk to their property.
In other words, respondents who are more supportive of either one of the mitigation measures are
the ones that would be more willing to accept some additional risk to their property. In light of
recent events (Tropical Storm Iselle and the June 2014-15 lava crisis) it makes sense that people
were more likely to accept some increased risk to their property to protect a major road, electrical
substations and schools. This study’s findings suggest that respondents’ will support lava diversion
strategies if the strategies are viewed as beneficial and respondents’ are willing to accept some of
the risk to their own property if it means the risk will allow them to protect elements in their
community that they deem critical.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The first study (described in Chapter 2) examined differences in people’s perceptions of
themselves and their families, their peers, news media, elected officials, and government
agencies regarding three characteristics—hazard expertise, trustworthiness, and protection
responsibility, across areas of varying lava flow hazard at Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes.
This study supports previous research indicating that people generally rely on themselves to
protect their lives and property and have trusted experts from whom they can seek information
while monitoring the onset of hazards such as lava flows (Birkmann et al. 2008; Lindell and
Perry 2012; Apatu et al. 2015). Confidence in the timeliness and accuracy of lava flow forecasts
will allow these residents to prepare for and take protective action when the need arises.
Although government agencies should take care to avoid promoting excessively high levels of
confidence in warnings and forecasts when current scientific and emergency management
constraints cannot support such actions, they should also recognize that people understand that
such forecasts are uncertain. Risk communication will be most effective if scientists describe the
range of plausible outcomes, the reasons for the uncertainty in their forecasts, and update their
forecasts on a regular schedule.
In general, then first study also showed the relationship between respondents’ confidence in
several events important in decision-making during emergencies. Evacuations were most
significantly correlated with respondents’ past experience with lava forecasts. This supported
previous findings— that past hazard experience has a significant influence on perceived
confidence in warnings. The study also found that respondents’ community bondedness had a
significant influence on their confidence in warnings and their perceptions of stakeholders.
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The goal of the second study (Chapter 3) was to better understand public opinion about
various mitigation strategies that have been used on the island and people’s acceptance of
additional risk to personal property in exchange for helping protect important elements of their
community, such as roads, electrical substations, schools, and shopping centers. We examined
this issue with regards to the correlations of respondents’ perceptions of stakeholders, their past
crisis experience, the lava flow hazard zone in which they live, their confidence in warnings, and
their socio-demographic and cultural characteristics with their perceived characteristics of two
common mitigation measures— berms/barriers and bombs. Several eruptions of Kīlauea and
Mauna Loa over the last ca. 100 years provided island residents and agencies with abundant lava
flow hazard experience. Earthen barriers, bombs and water have been the most common
strategies used to date to mitigate lava flows and their impacts, but a variety of factors outlined
by the State Lava Flow Hazard Technical Committee report (Hawaii State Civil Defense 2002)
suggest that official barriers and bombs are unlikely to be used. And while there are certainly
technical and feasibility considerations when diverting lava flows, the conclusion reached in the
report is in part due to the widespread belief that Hawaiian people oppose interfering in the path
of lava, so cultural sensitivity to mitigation is likely to prevent the use of lava mitigation
strategies. But at Kīlauea in 2014, there were opposing voices over the use of diversion strategies
(some supported it if it could be done, while others were adamantly against it). However, there
was no public opposition to the actions of the Hawaiian Electric Light Company protecting the
electrical grid. Overall, respondents supported earthen berms/trenches more than
bombing/blasting and were more willing to accept some increased risk to protect major roads,
electrical substations, and schools.
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Future work will continue to improve resilience to eruptions through better understanding of
hazard processes, such as emplacement of lava flows and perceptions and responses by the
general population. Government officials charged with making decisions about whether
evacuation is warranted must evaluate the risks of unnecessary or delayed evacuations. If they
can make reliable predictions of how individuals and communities respond to information about
the volcanic event and its hazards, along with information about protective actions, including
evacuation in response to warnings, then they will be better prepared to balance those risks.
Similarly, physical scientists have the chance to learn from stakeholders such as policy makers
and residents regarding decision criteria and societal priorities, which may help guide priorities
in how to reduce, treat, and communicate uncertainties.
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